Plumb v. Stahl (1921) · DecisionDepot

Plumb v. Stahl

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Court of Appeal Oct 24, 1921 No. Civ. No. 2366.Published

Before: Prewett

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Holding. When a publication is libelous per se and the defendant admits to the publication, the plaintiff is conclusively entitled to a verdict for compensatory damages, and it is error to instruct the jury that they may determine whether or not damages should be allowed.

Issues

Whether a jury may be instructed to determine if damages should be awarded when a publication is admitted to be libelous per se.
Whether evidence regarding matters not in issue, such as the whereabouts of the plaintiff's son or prior unrelated publications, is admissible in a libel action.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Under this state of facts the appellant was entitled to a verdict for damages, and it was error for the court to charge the jury that they might find to the contrary.”

“If the publication is a libel per se, the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages.”

“The publication being admitted, it was error to charge the jury that it was their province to determine whether or not damages should be allowed.”

Synopsis

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Opinion — Prewett

[646]

PREWETT, J.,

pro

tem.

The respondents published in their newspaper a charge that appellant had committed a burglary and that he was suspected of having committed another burglary. The appellant lived and carried .on business within the city in which the libel was published. The respondents admit that the charge is untrue, and thereby admit the commission of the libel. The appellant sued for damages. The language charged is clearly libelous

per se.

Words of doubtful import and words of two or more meanings are not libelous unless the jury finds that they were used in a libelous sense.

[1]

But it has always been held that it is libel

per se

to charge a person with the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case there is no pretense that the libel was not published and no pretense that the language used is true.

[2]

Under this state of facts the appellant was entitled to a verdict for damages, and it was error for the court to charge the jury that they might find to the contrary. The publication being admitted, it was error to charge the jury that it was their province to determine whether or not damages should be allowed. Under the law the appellant should have had a verdict.

Childers

Mercury etc.,

105 Cal. 289 [45 Am. St. Rep. 40, 38 Pac. 903], the court says:

“This publication charged plaintiff with the commission of a felony.

“It was false, not privileged, and libelous

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Opinion — Prewett

PREWETT, J.,

pro

tem.

In denying the petition in this case for a rehearing, it is proper to add that it was error to require the witness, Mrs. Plumb, to testify on cross-examination, as to the whereabouts of her son and as to other matters concerning him and his companion. These matters were not in issue and their truth or falsity was a matter of no moment in this case. Likewise, the testimony of Officer Malone along the same lines should not have been admitted.

Evidence of the publication in the newspaper of respondents, about one month prior to the publication of the libel in question, and entitled “Crook Tried to Rob Store,” was for like reasons improperly admitted. That someone attempted to commit the burglary in the publication mentioned may be conceded, but the respondents do not claim that the appellant did it or was in any manner connected with it. The proofs showed that the store referred to is under the office used by the appellant as a taxicab office. The evidence could only have been offered for the purpose of prejudicing the ease of the appellant, in view of the charge in the libel that he was suspected of having attempted the burglary. It was otherwise wholly immaterial.

Other points urged by appellant do not require special notice. The appellant chose to tender the issue that the libel was published “maliciously,” and so long as the complaint remains in its present shape he must bear the burdens arising from that tender. The respondents are entitled to

[649]

meet the charge of malice (in order to reduce the amount of punitive damages) by appropriate pleadings and evidence. If the demands of the appellant had been limited to mere compensation for the actual injury suffered, of course, the proofs would have been limited to that question. Under that state of the issues, the respondents would have been restricted to proofs minimizing the extent of the actual injury suffered.

(Davis

Hearst,

160 Cal. 143 [116 Pac. 530].)

Under the issues in the ease, the court did not err in permitting the respondents to show that they believed that the William Plumb reported to them as having committed the burglary was the appellant, and as explanatory of their attitude as to actual malice, that it had in fact been reported to them from reliable sources that another person of the same name had committed the offense. But under an issue as to mere compensation only, such proofs would have been inadmissible.

(Taylor

Hearst,

118 Cal. 366 [50 Pac. 541]; Id., 107 Cal. 262 [40 Pac. 392].)

Rehearing denied.

Finch, P. J., and Burnett, J., concurred.

AI Brief

Synopsis

Opinion — Prewett

PREWETT, J.,

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Opinion — Prewett

PREWETT, J.,

AI Brief