Young v. State Athletic Commission
Before: Houser
HOUSER, J.
Section 3 of the State Athletic Act (Stats. 1925, pp. lxxxix, xc), includes the provision that the Commission created by such act be given “discretion” to issue licenses to conduct wrestling contests “to any club, corporation, organization or association which holds a lease of a term of at least one year of the premises” in which such contests are proposed to be held. Other rules governing the issuance of a license for the exhibition of athletic contests are either directly provided for by the statute, or, under the powers granted to the Commission, are prescribed by such Commission.
Acting under assumed compliance with the provisions of the statute, as well as with such regulations as theretofore
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had been adopted by the Commission, the appellant in this proceeding presented his application to said Commission for a license by which he would be given the privilege of conducting wrestling bouts at the “Shrine Auditorium” in the city of Los Angeles. The application was denied.' Thereupon, through the medium of a writ of mandate issued by the superior court, he sought to compel the Commission to issue to him such license. On return of the alternative writ and on hearing of the order to show cause therein, by order of the trial court the writ was discharged; and the petitioner has appealed to this court from such order or judgment.
Although much argument is presented by respective counsel with reference to the question of the right of the Commission to act “arbitrarily” in making its order by which the application of appellant for a license was denied, it is conceded that, under the provisions of the statute, the Commission was authorized to act within its “discretion” in the premises. Accordingly, if by considering the terms of the application itself, or by considering any other fact relevant to a determination by the Commission as to whether the license should be issued to the applicant, it appear either that the applicant failed to comply with the statutory requirements, or that a discretion free from abuse thereof was or may have been exercised by the Commission in reaching its conclusion, it is clear that its action in the premises cannot be reviewed or controlled either by the lower court, or in effect by this tribunal.
To the end that a sufficient reason may be discovered for the order by the Commission by which the application for a license was denied, it becomes pertinent to examine such application and a portion of the statute which relates to the issuance of such license. Reverting to the provisions of section 3 of the act to which attention hereinbefore has been directed, it will be noted that, leading to the issuance of a license, one of the requirements is that the applicant “holds a lease of a term of at least one year of the premises” in which the proposed contests are to be held.
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