People v. McCarthy
Before: Allen
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Robbery—Evidence—Discharge from Jail—Penniless Condition—Possession of Property and Money upon Second Arrest.—Where the record upcw appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of robbery discloses that on a specified date the prosecuting witness was brutally assaulted and robbed, and that beyond peradventure the defendant was guilty of the crime, evidence was admissible to show that the plaintiff was in jail before the robbery on that day, and was discharged therefrom in a penniless condition. Such evidence was material and important, in view of the fact that when arrested on the evening of the same day for the robbery, he was in possession of recently purchased wearing apparel, and of a sum of money secreted in one of his socks. The proof of his prior incarceration was, under the facts, relative to the issue being tried.
Id.—Proof of Material Independent Crime.—Whenever the case is such that proof of one crime tends to prove any fact material in the trial of another crime, such proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jiirors is no ground for its exclusion. This rule is applicable, when the evidence merely tends to show previous confinement in jail, when such confinement and the circumstances connected therewith, including the search of the defendant’s person at the time of the prion incarceration and condition at the time of the discharge, all tend to show facts proper and competent as aiding the jury in arriving at a proper verdict.
Id.—Absence of Misconduct of District Attorney or Court.—It was ■ not misconduct on the part of the district attorney to offer proof of the penniless condition of the defendant when confined in the jail and discharged therefrom, nor on the part of the court in its admission, considering its bearing upon the issue being tried. It was not misconduct of the district attorney to move to strike out objectionable evidence given by a witness, which was voluntarily given without being responsive to the question asked, nor to offer to show that defendant’s previous incarceration was under a commitment, where the court properly declined to receive such evidence, and it was Immaterial in establishing the penniless condition of the defendant when discharged, and could not prejudice the defendant.
Id.—Impeachment of Defendant as a Witness—Foundation.—The court did not err in admitting the evidence of witnesses to impeach the testimony of defendant by showing that his reputation for truth, honesty and integrity was bad, although they were not shown to have a very extended and intimate acquaintance with the defendant, where each of them stated that he was acquainted with his general reputation in the community for truth, honesty and integrity.
Id.—Bule as to Qualification of Impeaching Witnesses.—It is sufficient that impeaching witnesses be acquainted with the prevailing impression in the community as disclosed by actions, conduct or conversations relating to the character in issue, although it is not necessary that the witness testifying should know that the majority of the community have that impression.
ALLEN, P. J.
Defendant and appellant was convicted of the crime of robbery, and from the judgment and an order denying a motion for a new trial he appeals.
The record discloses that on the 21st of January, 1910, the prosecuting witness was brutally assaulted and robbed, and that beyond peradventure defendant was guilty of the crime. It is sought to have the judgment reversed on account of technical matters connected with the trial, the most prominent being a claim that the court erred in admitting testimony tending to show that defendant had been incarcerated in the jail at San Luis Obispo county before commission of the robbery. Were this character of evidence disconnected with that tending to show guilt of the offense charged, the error would be apparent
(People
v.
Derbert,
138 Cal. 470, [71 Pac. 564]); but it is obvious that the object and purpose of the district attorney in proffering and making
[150]
this proof was to show that defendant on the morning of the robbery, and within a few hours before the same was committed, was penniless. This was material and important, in view of the fact that upon his arrest in the evening of the same day defendant was found in possession of wearing apparel recently purchased and a sum of money secreted in one of his socks. The proof of his incarceration, therefore, was relative to the issue being tried. As said by our supreme court, speaking through Chief Justice Beatty, in
People
v.
Walters,
98 Cal. 141, [32 Pac. 865]: “Whenever the case is such that proof of one crime tends to prove any fact material in the trial of another, such proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no ground for its exclusion.” We can see no reason why this rule, as applicable to proof of independent substantive crime, should not be equally so when the evidence merely tends to show confinement in the jail, which may or may not have been on account of previous criminal conduct, and when such confinement and the circumstances connected therewith, including the search of defendant’s person at the time of incarceration and condition at the time of discharge, all tend to show facts proper and competent as aiding the jury in arriving at a proper verdict. We see no misconduct on the part of the district attorney in offering this proof, nor on the part of the court in its admission, considering its bearing upon the issue being tried.
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