Weill v. Danziger

JAMES, J.

Plaintiff herein brought this action to recover for goods, wares, and merchandise which he alleged he had furnished to defendant. Collins and Wiltsee were not served with process, and the cause proceeded to trial as against de

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fendants Danziger and Kent. Judgment was in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Danziger alone. Motion for a new trial was made and denied, and an appeal was then taken from that order and from the judgment.

The merchandise on account of the purchase price of which this action was brought, was all ordered by and first charged to defendant Kent. Later the charge, at Kent’s direction, was transferred to the name of “Lost Hills Syndicate.” The trial court found that Kent in making the purchase of the goods acted as the agent of his eodefendants and not as a principal. The evidence which it is claimed is insufficient to support this finding was mainly given by Kent himself, who testified that he was conducting the business for Danziger and Wiltsee in moving rig irons and operating in the Lost Hills territory. He testified as follows: “They were building rigs and holding down located ground. They were purchasing supplies. I purchased supplies for them from Mr. Weill. They were part of them charged to my account, in my name, with the understanding from Mr. Danziger and Mr. Wiltsee that they would reimburse me when they named the company and then change the account to the company’s name. I told Mr. Weill that Mr. Wiltsee and Mr. Danziger would be responsible for these bills. I had authority from them for giving such instructions.” A letter from Danziger to Kent was introduced in evidence, also a telegram. The letter informed Kent that a cheek for seven hundred dollars to be used in connection with expenditures in the Lost Hills was inclosed. The telegram contained instructions from Danziger to Kent to sacrifice rigs and rig irons if necessary to pay the King Lumber Company one thousand dollars. Kent testified that the goods which he purchased from the plaintiff and for which the action was brought were all used in connection with the operations which he was conducting and managing for Wiltsee and Danziger. The haze which enveloped the question as to the precise agreement under which defendants were operating was not clearly dispelled by any of the evidence. Danziger by his testimony admitted that he was associated in some way (not precisely defined or explained) with Kent and Wiltsee, and did not deny that the goods for which plaintiff’s charge was made were used in the transaction of that business. He was extremely hazy in his explanation of how he was to be