People v. Hirsch
Before: Hall
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Pandering—What Constitutes.—One who procures a woman to be received into a house of prostitution, to there follow the calling of a prostitute, is guilty of pandering, although she is received in the house on the condition that she should not ply her trade until registering with the police department and passing the clinic, which is never accomplished because of her arrest the day following.
Id.—Inmate op House op Prostitution—Who is.—A woman who enters a house of prostitution with intent to remain, if she obtains a certificate from the clinical board and the consent of the police officers, is an inmate of the house while there with that intention, although she remains there only for twenty-four hours and does not ply her trade while there.
HALL, J.
Defendant was charged, under the act against pandering (Stats. 1911, p. 9), with having procured for a female person a place as an inmate in a house of prostitution. Upon trial he was convicted, and took an appeal to this court from the judgment and order denying his motion for a new trial.
The appellant contends that the evidence does not show that defendant procured a
place as inmate
in a house of prostitution for the'woman, because, as he contends, the evidence shows that although he took the woman to the house and made application to the keeper of the house to allow the woman to go to work there as a prostitute, and she was in fact allowed to enter and remain in the house for the night and until she was arrested by the police officers the next day, it was upon condition that she should not go to work or receive visitors until she had reported to and been registered by the police department, and had passed the clinic as required by the practice of the police department.
The argument being that under the statute and the charge as made, a woman cannot be said to have received a
place as an immate
of a house of prostitution until she has been received into such a house with the privilege of plying the vocation of a prostitute.
. Even if this be the correct interpretation of the statute insofar as it is directed against a person who “shall procure for a female person a place as inmate in a house of prostitution,” we think the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the verdict.
[739]
It is true that the keeper of the house testified that she told defendant when he applied to her to allow the -woman (whom we shall designate by the initials C. L.) to go to work in the house, that the woman must first see the officers, Puhrman and Callahan, and pass the clinic; that she also testified that she told her housekeeper who had immediate charge of this particular house (the owner and keeper being personally engaged in running a near-by house) not to allow the woman C. L. to receive visitors until she had obtained permission from Puhrman and Callahan and the clinic.
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