People v. Murphy

JAMISON, J.,

pro

tem.

Appellant was convicted upon both counts of an information charging him with two separate burglaries, and appeals from the judgment ■ of conviction and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

His main contention is that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict.

As to the first count of the information, the undisputed facts are that on the fourth day of July, 1927, one J. A. Grenier was the owner of a garage in the city of Merced; that on that day he was alone in his garage; that he absented himself therefrom for about fifteen minutes and that upon his return he discovered that a number of his tools were missing; that on the seventh day of July, 1927, appellant appeared at the place of business of Darwin E. East, in Merced, who was a dealer in used ears, and offered to sell

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and did sell to said East a portion of the tools that were stolen from Grenier’s garage.

As to the second count of the information, the undisputed facts are that- I. D. Harris owned a garage in said city of Merced in September, 1927; that between the 10th and 11th of September, 1927, someone forced an entrance into his garage and took away a number of tools belonging to him. Shortly thereafter appellant appeared at East’s place of business and offered to sell him a portion of the tools taken from the garage of Harris. East refused to p.urchase any of said last-named tools. Appellant thereupon told East that he was going to San Francisco, and asked permission of East to leave the tools with him until his return, to which request East consented and thereupon appellant left the tools with East.

Appellant in his brief admits that the facts proven are sufficient to show that a burglary was committed as charged in the second count of the information and that the proceeds of said burglary were later found in the possession of appellant, but claims that possession of the stolen goods is not sufficient to establish the fact that the burglary was committed by appellant.

It is true that the mere unexplained possession of stolen property, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify a conviction for burglary. (Vol. 4, Gal. Jur., page 741 and authorities there cited.) But, in the case of