Taylor v. Lewis

ARCHBALD, J.,

pro

tem.

On the day of trial of the action arising out of plaintiff’s complaint for damages based on an alleged libel, defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence on behalf of plaintiff on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The objection was sustained and plain

[383]

tiff’s motion for leave to amend was denied. From the judgment thereafter entered plaintiff has appealed.

To save expense the objection referred to was made prior to the impanelment of a jury, on stipulation of the pallies.

The complaint alleges in effect that at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article plaintiff was a duly elected and qualified member of the city council of Long Beach, and that defendant wilfully and maliciously caused to be published an article which exposed him to hatred, contempt and ridicule, which article is alleged to be false and unprivileged; that the same was published in the “Press Telegram”, a newspaper of general circulation in Long Beach, the important parts thereof being hereinafter referred to.

No malice in fact in the publication appears on the face of the complaint, unless it is shown by the language used in the article. It is appellant’s contention that the article is libelous

per se.

Section 45 of the Civil Code defines libel, so far as material here, as “a‘false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, . . . which exposes any person.to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy”. It will be seen from such definition that the publication is not required to have been made “maliciously” to be a libel. All that is required is that it should be both

false and unprivileged,

and of such a character as to expose the subject thereof to contempt, etc.; and such seems to be the ruling of our courts so far as compensatory damages are concerned, without either pleading or proof of malice by the plaintiff.