Bradford v. Trapp

California Court of Appeal Oct 6, 1920 No. Civ. No. 3506.Published

Before: Kinsell

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Holding. A judgment obtained under the McEnerney Act cannot be vacated on the basis of a forged deed used as evidence, as such an error is intrinsic to the judgment and not subject to collateral attack after the time for appeal has expired.

Issues

Whether a judgment obtained under the McEnerney Act can be set aside on the grounds of mistake when the underlying deed was a forgery.
Whether a judgment predicated on forged evidence constitutes intrinsic or extrinsic mistake.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It is a doctrine of law too long established to require the citation of authorities that where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question arising in the cause, and, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment until reversed is binding on every other court.”

“The forged deed in evidence was the equivalent of perjured testimony, and it is the settled law of this state that a judgment cannot be set aside because it is predicated upon perjured testimony.”

KINSELL, J.,

pro tem.

Defendants prosecute this appeal from a judgment in a suit in equity brought to vacate a judgment obtained by them as plaintiffs in a suit brought pursuant to the McEnemey Act (Stats. 1906, Ex. Sess., p. 78) against All Persons.

There is no material dispute as to the facts of the case, which are substantially as follows:

Defendants purchased certain real property on March 4, 1915, and upon paying therefor received a deed wherein one William Bradford was named as grantor, which deed was immediately recorded. They entered into possession of the premises and proceeded to erect a dwelling thereon, and on June 4, 1915, commenced a suit under the MeEnerney Act, which resulted in a judgment establishing the fact that they were the sole owners of the premises, which judgment was entered September 25, 1915. The proceedings in such suit are apparently regular and the judgment on the face of the record appears to be valid. The respondent was not in name made a party defendant in such suit nor was he personally served with summons therein.

In January, 1917, after the McEnemey judgment had become final, respondent Bradford appeared, claiming that the deed to appellants, and on which they based their title and claim in the McEnemey suit, was a forgery. His mo

[495]

tion for relief in the MeEnerney suit - having been denied, the present suit was instituted.

In this suit respondent recovered the judgment from which the appeal is taken. The respondent sought judgment on several counts, but that relied upon, and upon which the judgment of the lower court rests, sets forth that the judgment in the MeEnerney suit was granted by mistake in that it was not disclosed to the court that said deed purporting to have been executed by respondent to the appellants was a forgery. There is no element of fraud involved, since it appears affirmatively, and the trial court found, that the appellants did not know their deed to be a forgery, but believed it to be valid. The trial court further found, however, that the deed in dispute was a forgery.

Appellants contend that the judgment in the MeEnerney suit is final and conclusive upon the question of title to the property. ¡Stripped of its side issues concerning the admissibility of evidence, the appeal becomes practically a test of the strength uf a MeEnerney title.

Bradford v. Trapp

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KINSELL, J.,

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