In Re Giannini
Before: THE COURT. —
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Power of Court to Suspend Sentence for Maximum Term.—A court has power, under section 1208 of the Penal Code as amended in 1911, to place a defendant upon probation for the full maximum term of sentence provided for the offense of which he is convicted, and when a defendant is placed on probation without limitation of time, the same extends to such maximum term of sentence, and no longer.
Construction of Statute—Power of Suspension not Limited by Failure of Court to Place Defendant in Care of Probation Officer.—It is held that the proper construction of the statute is that absolute power of suspending sentence is given by such section of the Penal Code as amended, and that where a court acts under the statute, within the limits thereof, such order of suspension is not invalidated because the court omits a duty imposed by law upon it to place the party in charge of a probation officer. The functions of the probation officer are not to hold the defendant in cus- ’ tody, but to exercise a supervisory control over his conduct as an arm or instrument of the court.
Id.—Sentence not Intrusted to Probation Officer—Commitment upon Revocation of Suspension.—The legislative intent that no part of the sentence is included within the period of the probation officer’s surveillance is apparent when it is considered that upon the revocation of the original order of suspension, the law permits the commitment of the defendant for the full term of the sentence as originally pronounced. The statute confers the power of revocation and modification upon the court for any cause which to the court is good and sufficient.
Id.—Revocation of Suspension Essential to Power of Commitment. T.he court having, by its judgment, suspended the execution of the sentence under the statute, and having jurisdiction so to do, the same became an operative judgment of court, and so remains until revoked or modified by an order regularly made; and in order that the court should possess the power to issue a commitment to one whose sentence had theretofore been suspended, a revocation or modification of the order of suspension is an essential prerequisite.
Id.—Commitment by Justice of Peace—Affirmative Showing of Revocation of Suspension Required—Absence of Intendments. Where the order of suspension of sentence was made by a justice of the peace, no intendments can be made in favor .of a subsequent judgment of commitment made by Mm, under the sentence; but Ms jurisdiction to make it must affirmatively appear; and where the record does not disclose that any modification or revocation was ever made by the justice, the commitment by Mm was without authority of law, and the prisoner’s detention thereunder was unlawful.
Id.—Habeas Corpus.—The commitment being invalid, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged from custody thereunder upon writ of habeas corpus.
Id.—Code Provision not Conflicting With Executive Authority of Governor.—Section 1203 of the Penal Code, as now existing, regulating the suspension of sentences, and the power of commitment thereafter under the sentence, does not interfere in any way with the functions and duties of the governor of the state.
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