American Exchange National Bank v. Soffel
Before: York
YORK, J.
This is an appeal by defendant Soffel from a judgment awarded on two trade acceptances signed by said defendant and held by plaintiff.
[354]
The points raised by appellant would require a weighing of the evidence by this court. It cannot be said that there was not sufficient evidence to support the findings or that the findings were not sufficient to support the judgment. This is an action brought on two trade acceptances, and the court found that the plaintiff purchased said trade acceptances in the due course of business for value, prior to the maturity thereof; that plaintiff is an innocent purchaser for value of said trade acceptances, and that plaintiff is the holder for value of said trade acceptances.
The fact that the trial court had evidence before it that, at the time the trade acceptances were taken by the bank, the bank had made the statement upon the deposit slip, which was made out at the time the trade acceptances were presented to and accepted by the bank: “We will use our discretion as to sending direct or through intermediary banks for collection acting as your agent only and assuming no responsibility beyond carefulness in selecting such agents,” is not conclusive upon the trial court, other evidence having been introduced in reference to the transaction, and sufficient to prove that respondent was the holder of the acceptances by purchase in due course and for value;
The judgment is affirmed.
Conrey, P. J., and Houser, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on September 25, 1931, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:
THE COURT.
Inthis petition appellant lays much stress upon the proposition that there was a defect in the indorsements on the trade acceptances in this: That the acceptances, which were introduced in evidence without any explanation of the indorsements, show on their face that the Nature Products Company, at the time when it transferred the acceptances to respondent, was a prior party to whom the instruments had been negotiated back after transfer to other indorsees; and that by necessary inference it appears that the company transferred the acceptances to respondent by delivery without further indorsement. Appellant contends
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)