People v. Stevens
Before: Allen
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Assault With Deadly Weapon—Support op Verdict. In a prosecution for an assault with a deadly weapon, where the jury found a verdict of guilty as charged, and the evidence shows that from the nature and severity of the wounds produced, and that one of them was a clear cut to the bone, and another through the skull, it is held that the jury were warranted in concluding that a deadly weapon was employed in producing such wounds.
Id.—Instruction as to Guilt op Aider and Abettor op Crime— Omission op Qualification of Eeasonable Doubt—Inclusion Elsewhere.—An instruction as to the guilt of one who aids and abets a crime, as being that of a principal in the crime, is not erroneous for omitting the immediate element of reasonable doubt therein, where the court elsewhere explicitly instructed the jury that “in order to convict this defendant of the crime charged in the information, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of every material allegation thereof,” and also gave a charge preceding the instruction given, that “if after a full and careful consideration of all the evidence in this case you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed any one of the offenses defined in these instructions, then it will be your duty to acquit him.”
Id.—Repetition of Charge not Required.—When a material charge is once given, it is not necessary to repeat it in a different form; nor is each sentence of the charge required to contain all the conditions and qualifications which are to be gathered from the entire text.
Id.—Instruction Given at Defendant’s Request.—When an instruction is given at defendant’s request, he cannot complain thereof.
ALLEN, P. J.
This appeal is from a judgment following defendant’s conviction of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, and from an order denying a new trial.
There is evidence in the record tending to show that defend-, ant, together with three companions, laid in wait for the prosecuting witness at a point where he daily alighted from the electric cars upon his return from work; that on or about the 19th of September, 1910, at about 6 o’clock P. M. of said day, the prosecuting witness arrived at the station near his home and had proceeded about three blocks therefrom on his way to his residence when an assault was made upon him by defendant and his associates—one of whom hit him over the right eye with something and knocked him into the middle of the street, and while there he was cut in four or five places. One of these wounds was a scalp wound about an inch and a half long, and another about two inches long, at right angles with each other; two cuts in the middle of the forehead, with some bruises behind the left ear and some injuries upon the left wrist, which last-named injuries were evidenced by two round marks, looking as though they had been sunk in with something. After this assault defendant and his companions
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separated and fled, and the prosecuting witness was taken to his home in a conveyance by friends. Subsequently, on the 24th of September, the defendant was arrested and his trial and conviction followed.
Appellant presents three reasons why, in his opinion, the judgment of conviction and the order denying a new trial should be reversed; his first contention being that there is no evidence tending to show that the assault was committed by defendant, or that a deadly weapon was employed. That defendant was present and participated in the assault is pretty clearly established; that a deadly weapon was employed is established by the physician’s testimony to the effect that one of the wounds seemed to be a clear cut, clear to the bone, and another through to the skull; that they were of such character as might have been caused by the use of a sharp instrument and were so located that death might have ensued. In addition to this, at the time of the trial the wounds had not yet healed; the jury had before them the injured man and the nature and character of the wounds, and, considering all of the testimony, we think sufficient was shown to warrant the jury in concluding that the assault was committed with a weapon as charged in the information. We, therefore, see nothing in appellant’s first contention warranting a reversal.
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