Sparks v. Prior

WORKS, P. J.

The Board of Dental Examiners had before it for hearing a petition or complaint in which it was averred that Dr. Sparks was a “regularly licensed and practicing dentist” in the state, as defined by law. The document also alleged that Sparks “did knowingly and wilfully and unlawfully aid and abet an unlicensed person, to wit, David Michaud, to practice dentistry unlawfully in the

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State of California, in that the said Perl A. Sparks did then and there permit, authorize and allow said David Michaud to make and enter into contracts, for the performance of dental services, with the public in his office located at 506 South Hill Street, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, which office was a place where dental operations are performed; and that said David Michaud did then and there, and has for two years last past immediately preceding the date hereof, managed and conducted, as manager or conductor, the office or place of business of said Perl A. Sparks, which office was a place where dental operations were performed, all of which the said Perl A. Sparks well knew, that during all of said time David Michaud was and said David Michaud now is an unlicensed person and was not and is not entitled to practice dentistry in the State of California”. Upon this complaint, after due hearing, the board ordered the suspension of Sparks’ license to practice dentistry in the state for five years, with a certain condition under which the license might be restored in one year. Sparks petitioned the superior court for the writ of review, the writ was ordered, and upon final hearing after return, the court annulled the order of the dental board. Defendants, none of whom is a proper party except the board itself, appeal from the judgment of annulment.

The complaint before the board plainly stated grounds, under the State Dental Act, for the rendition of the order which the board made. Indeed, respondent does not contend otherwise. " Nor is the point made that there was a failure to prove, before the board, any single fact necessary to enable it to exercise its jurisdiction under the complaint. As the writ of review lies only to correct the exercise of power without jurisdiction, there is but one remaining point open to respondent, and that point he embraces. He contends that there was no evidence whatever before the board to the effect that Michaud was practicing dentistry in the office of respondent. It is admitted by respondent that Michaud was at least in the same situation as that ascribed to Cohn in