Griffin v. Kent

California Court of Appeal Feb 5, 1931 No. Docket No. 7737.Published

Before: Sturtevant

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that an oil lease provision requiring the commencement of drilling within a specified time, absent a forfeiture or condition clause, constitutes a covenant rather than a condition, allowing the lessor to enforce rental payments despite the lessee's failure to drill.

Issues

Whether a provision in an oil lease limiting the time to commence drilling acts as a condition that terminates the lease and rental obligations upon expiration of that time.
Whether a lessor may elect to enforce rental payments under a lease after the lessee fails to commence drilling.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It does not in any place contain a clause to the effect that under certain circumstances it is to be null and void nor that under certain circumstances either party is to incur a forfeiture, nor does it contain the word “condition””

“if doubtful language was contained in the lease such doubtful language would be construed as a covenant and not as a condition”

“In the instant case the plaintiffs did not rescind, but they kept the contract alive and sued thereon.”

STURTEVANT, J.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendant to recover moneys alleged to be due on an oil lease. The defendant answered and from a

[570]

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs the defendant has appealed. In their complaint the plaintiffs pleaded the lease

in lima verla,

and further alleged that certain rentals had accrued and had not been paid. In his answer the defendant made certain denials, but pleaded no affirmative matter.

By way of introduction the plaintiffs call to our attention certain rules governing the construction of written instruments by the court. (Civ. Code, secs. 1636, 1638 and 1641.) The plaintiffs do not contend that the rules referred to are not sound, but they do contend that in the instant ease they have no application. The defendant also contends that the provisions of the contract favorable to one of the parties should be considered as having been inserted and worded by him and that in the event any one of such provisions is ambiguous ■ it should be construed against him. (13 Cor. Jur. 546.) In reply the plaintiffs call to our attention the testimony of the defendant which was to the effect that he and his associate, Mr. Wall, drew the instrument. The lease, among other things, contained the following provisions:

“Witnesseth: That the said lessors . . . do . . . grant, convey, lease, demise and let unto the said lessee, for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas, and the laying of pipe-lines and building tanks, stations and structures thereon to produce, save and take care of said products, all that tract of land. ...

“It is Agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of five years from date, and as long thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, is produced upon said land in paying quantities, by said lessee or his assigns. In consideration of the premises the said lessee covenants and agrees as follows:

“1. To deliver to the credit of the lessors (a royalty of i/8) - • -

“2.

If no well be commenced upon the above described land within six months from this date lessee agrees to pay the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month until said well shall be commenced, at which time the $100.00 per month payment ceases, provided the operations are continued faithfully and diligently until well has been drilled to a depth of 3000 feet unless oil or gas is found at a lesser depth,

Griffin v. Kent

AI Brief

STURTEVANT, J.

More from California Court of Appeal

Related research

AI Brief