Kendall v. Kendall

TUTTLE, J.,

pro

tem.

This is an appeal, by bill of exceptions, from an order discharging an order to show cause why further payments for the support of respondent’s minor child should not be made.

On November 20, 1920, by judgment of divorce between these parties, it was ordered that respondent pay to appellant the sum of $30 a month for the support and maintenance of their minor child. The minor became eighteen years of age upon August 11, 1927. Upon July 29, 1927, an act of the legislature became effective [Stats. 1927, p. 1119], whereby the age of minority of females was changed from eighteen to twenty-one years (sec. 25, Civ. Code). Thereafter respondent was cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court in failing to make the monthly payments mentioned. It is conceded that respondent made such payments until said minor reached the age of eighteen years, but it is now contended by appellant that such payments should be made until the minor reached the age of twenty-one years. The trial court held that respondent had fully complied with the order, and discharged the proceedings.

The contention of appellant is that “as long as the child retains the status of a minor and the court has not modified its order the child is entitled to the payments ordered in the decree”. In other words, that the act of the legislature should be retroactive in effect so that the obligation of re

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spondent to make said payments or his liability for the support of the minor, under the judgment, would be extended for a period of three years.

The general principle of law governing the disposition of this case is stated as follows, in

Collet

v.

Alioto,

210 Cal. 65 [290 Pac. 438, 440] : “It is too well settled to require citation of authority that in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary, every statute will be construed so as not to affect pending causes of action. Or, as the rule is generally stated, every statute will be construed to operate prospectively and will not be given a retrospective effect, unless the intention that it should have that effect is clearly expressed.” In Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 464, the rule is thus laid down: “A statute should not receive such construction as to make it impair existing rights, create new obligations, or impose new duties in respect to past transactions, unless such plainly appear to be the intention of the legislature. In the absence of such plain expression of design, it should be construed prospectively only, although its words are broad enough in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases.” The foregoing rule applies with particular force to those statutes the retroactive operation of which would impair or destroy vested rights. (36 Cyc., p. 1210.)