In Re Grimes
Before: Conrey
CONREY, P. J.
On the eighteenth day of February, 1929, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, an indictment was returned whereby the petitioner and seven others were charged with the crime of criminal conspiracy, a felony, to wit, a conspiracy to commit the crime of falsely and maliciously procuring another to be charged and arrested for a crime in violation of subdivision 2, section 182, of the Penal Code. Prior to that date petitioner had been a witness before the grand jury in relation to said matter, and knew that the subject of the proposed indictment was being considered. Between the time of the filing of the indictment and issuance of a warrant for petitioner’s arrest, she left the state of California. On March 11th she was arrested in the state of Texas, waived extradition proceedings, and returned in the custody of the arresting officers to the county of Los Angeles, California, where she was brought before the -Superior Court, and was allowed bail in the sum of $20,000, which she has not been able to procure.
By her petition in this proceeding, petitioner alleges that said amount of bail is
per se
unreasonably large and disproportionately excessive; that the court abused its discretion in fixing her bail at said sum, especially in view of the fact that each of her co-defendants was admitted to bail in the sum of $2,000.
At this point we will digress from the main issue to take notice of the allegation in the petition that several
[12]
bond companies have informed petitioner that for political reasons her bond could not be written, and the further allegation “that in one instance the attorney for your petitioner learned that the district attorney of Los Angeles county had issued instructions that bond should not be written for your petitioner under any circumstances.” We venture to suggest that such conduct of the district attorney after an order admitting a defendant to bail would constitute contempt of court and would be an unlawful interference with the order of the court, and that if in fact the attorney for petitioner has knowledge of any ’ such conduct, he might appropriately bring the facts before the proper tribunal, which, however, is not this court or in this proceeding. It must not be inferred, however, that we have given any weight or credence to the charge.
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