California Products, Inc. v. Mitchell

WORKS, J.

This is an action under a complaint in two counts, one based upon a forcible entry, the other upon a forcible detainer. Judgment went for the plaintiff and the defendants appeal.

The evidence shows, without dispute, that at a time when the agents of respondent were away from the premises in question, the appellants removed a certain lock from the door by means of which access was had to the place and to which lock respondent had the key. Appellants then' effected an entrance to the premises and substituted a heavy padlock in place of the lock. Thereupon certain personal property of respondent was removed from the place, property of one of appellants was placed therein, and thereafter that appellant remained in possession of the premises, excluding respondent therefrom. At the time when appellants effected their entrance into the property respondent was five months in arrears in the payment of its rent. Respondent was in possession, before the entry of appellants, under a lease from some of them, the instrument containing a provision that in ease the rent reserved by it were at any time unpaid it should be lawful for the lessors, “without previous notice or demand, to re-enter the demised premises and the same peaceably to hold and enjoy thenceforth as if this lease had not been made.”

The appellants contend that the evidence does not support several findings of the trial court, the point made being dependent upon the settlement of two questions of law. It is insisted by appellants, first, that the acts committed by

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them did not amount to a forcible entry; second, that they were permitted to retake possession of the premises, even in the manner in which they did, under the provision of the lease which we have quoted.

The first question is not difficult of solution. The code provides (Code Civ. Proc., see. 1159) that every person is guilty of a forcible entry who breaks open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, and it has been held

(Winchester

v.

Becker,

4 Cal. App. 382 [88 Pac. 296]) that one who enters the house of another by the use of a false key, thus unlocking the door in the absence of the occupant, is within the language of the section. The court said, in deciding the question, “The meaning of the provision is that any opening of a closed door or window involving the use of force is to be regarded as ‘breaking open’ the door or window or house.” The acts of the appellants in the present action clearly amounted to a forcible entry.