Robertson v. Drew

[144]

KERRIGAN, J.

Plaintiff prosecuted this appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant in an action on a lease to recover rent.

In August, 1913, plaintiff leased certain premises to the defendant for the term of one year from August 11, 1913, with the privilege to defendant of “renewing the lease” for a further term of from one to five years. On August 11, 1914, the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff stating in part that he had elected to take the premises for a further period of two years. On August 21st the plaintiff replied to this letter saying: “If you will call at the office we will fix you up.” Defendant, however, did not call, but remained in the premises, paying the same rent as before, until the month of January following, when he gave up possession without the consent of the plaintiff. The premises remained unoccupied until August 14, 1916. It is sought in this action to recover an amount representing rent payable up to the date last mentioned under the claim that by the foregoing correspondence the lease had been renewed for the term indicated.

First in order of presentation and importance is the question whether the term of the lease was so extended.

There appears by the decided cases to be a clear distinction between the meaning of the expressions “renewing a lease” and “extending the term” thereof. A covenant providing for the renewal of a lease at the option of the lessee imports the giving of a new lease; but where the option given is for an

extension

of the term, the lessee upon notice, if notice is required, or by remaining in possession, if no notice is required, is entitled to hold for the additional period. But as to what is meant by the expression “renewal” of a lease in a given ease may depend upon a reading of the whole instrument in which it occurs and upon the practical construction given to its provisions by the parties themselves. °

(Shamp

v.

White,

106 Cal. 220, [39 Pac. 537];