Riley v. Stack

California Court of Appeal Dec 29, 1932 No. Docket No. 8798.Published

Before: Nourse

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Holding. The court held that the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act does not violate due process clauses because a county is a political subdivision of the state, not a 'person' entitled to such protections, and the legislature has the authority to mandate that counties bear the costs of their residents' care. Furthermore, a judicial determination of residence in a commitment proceeding is conclusive and not subject to collateral attack by ministerial county officers.

Issues

Whether the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act's requirement that counties pay for the care of committed residents violates the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions.
Whether a county may collaterally attack a superior court's finding of residence made during an ex parte commitment proceeding.

Disposition. writ issued

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A county in this state does not come under either class. It is merely a political subdivision of the state over which the legislature has the inherent right to prescribe the powers, duties and obligations”

“Our conclusion is that the act does not offend the due process clause in so far as the county is concerned because the county is not a “person” within the meaning of either the federal or the state Constitution”

NOURSE, P. J.

This is an original proceeding in

mandamus

to require the respondents to comply with the provisions of the “Narcotic Rehabilitation Act” (Stats. 1927, p. 149; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act No. 5320).

The facts are without dispute. A “patient” within the meaning of the act was duly and regularly committed to the state narcotic hospital by order of the Superior Court sitting in the City and County of San Francisco. In that proceeding the “patient” was found to be a resident of the county of ■San Mateo and the court thereupon entered its order that San Mateo County make payments to the state of California for the support of the inmate of the state hospital pursuant to the act. The respondents defend upon the sole ground that San Mateo County was not.a party to the proceeding leading to the commitment and had no opportunity to contest the issue of the residence of the inmate.

Section 3 of the act authorizes the arrest and the trial and commitment before “a judge of the superior court” of “any person” found to be a drug addict. Section 4 provides that, “at the hearing”, the court must inquire into the financial condition of the person committed, and that the court may order the payment of such sums as it may deem just to “the county, or city and county, of which such person is a

bona fide

resident” during such time as the person committed may remain in the state hospital. Section 11 provides that for each person committed “the county of which he is a

bona fide

resident shall pay the state at the rate of twenty-five dollars per month for the time such person so committed remains an inmate of the institution”. Section 12 imposes the duty upon the county auditor to include the amount due under this act in his state settlement report, and requires the county treasurer to pay such amount to the state treasurer.

The respondents admit that they have not performed these duties. They also admit the allegations of the petition that the inmate was duly and regularly committed to the state institution, and that the superior court, in the commitment proceeding, found that the inmate was a

bona fide

resident of San Mateo County.

[483]

Riley v. Stack

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NOURSE, P. J.

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