Malter v. National Fire Insurance

[199]

LANGDON, P. J.

This action is to recover from each of the defendants two thousand dollars on fire insurance policies issued and delivered by them, covering certain personal property and insuring plaintiff against loss by fire. The case was tried by the court, without a jury. Judgment was for the plaintiff against both defendants.

[1]

The first ground for appeal urged by the appellants is the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the findings of the court. The finding which is particularly attacked is the one wherein the court finds that the plaintiff was, at the time of the issuance and delivery of the policies, and at the time of the fire, the sole and unconditional owner of the property specified in the policies. The testimony of the plaintiff on this point amply supports the finding. There was also other testimony which would raise a presumption of ownership in the plaintiff. The only evidence tending to prove the contrary is the testimony of a deputy tax assessor, who testified that the plaintiff had signed a tax return in 1917 in which the wines and brandies and wine-making apparatus covered by the insurance poli, cies, and also other property, real and personal, were listed in the names of Pacific Vineyard Company and Mabel P. Malter. Plaintiff admitted signing the tax statement, in which the property was so listed, and explained that his vineyard and wines and manufacturing apparatus had at one time been transferred to the Pacific Vineyard Company merely for convenience; that he had always been the real owner; that the stock of that company was owned by him, and that he had always paid the taxes on the property, although for a time the record title had been in this company; that it was no longer in the company and that he had neglected to have the name changed on the assessment list, which list was made out by the assessor from previous records. There was no other testimony tending to disprove plaintiff’s ownership in the property. We are of the opinion that the court was clearly justified in finding for the plaintiff on this issue.

[2]

The only other objection urged by appellants is that the court erred in excluding the statement made by the plaintiff to the assessor in 1917. Granted, for the purposes of this opinion, that the statement should have been