People v. Schumann-Heink

California Court of Appeal Apr 12, 1929 No. Docket No. 1756.Published

Before: Houses, Conrey

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Holding. The court held that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury to determine whether a witness was an accomplice, as the evidence established the witness was an accomplice as a matter of law, requiring corroboration of his testimony.

Issues

Whether the trial court erred in submitting the question of whether a witness was an accomplice to the jury rather than deciding it as a matter of law.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant must be acquitted if the witness acted without the defendant's instructions.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“where the facts are not in dispute, where the acts and conduct of the witness are admitted, it becomes a question of law for the court to say whether or not those acts and facts make the witness an accomplice.”

“The error consisted in leaving it open to the jury to determine that Clare was not an accomplice, and that the defendant, therefore, might be convicted on the testimony of Clare alone.”

“It is quite possible, and might easily have been, that if the testimony of the witness Clare had been definitely placed before the jury as the testimony of an accomplice, a different verdict would have been returned.”

Opinion — Conrey

CONREY, P. J.

The Schumann-Heink Company, Inc., a corporation of which the defendant and appellant was the president, was organized for the purpose of carrying on a general stock and bond brokerage business. Its main office was in the city of San Diego, but later an office was opened in the city of Los Angeles. The defendant and appellant devoted most of his time to the management of the latter office, while the active management of the business in San Diego was in the hands of Wilfred M. Clare, who was secretary and treasurer of the corporation.

Prior to the transaction under investigation appellant had executed his personal note to the United States National Bank, at San Diego, for $3,500, which was unsecured. After a time he paid $500 on this note and gave the bank a new demand note, for $3,000 to cover the balance. Thereafter, while appellant was in Los Angeles, the bank demanded payment of the note and communicated with Clare, who thereupon indorsed the note -and offered to secure the same. His offer was accepted, and Clare brought to the bank a list of personal securities from which the bank selected twelve shares of stock of the Security Commercial and Savings Bank of San Diego, which stock was i'ssu'ed in the name of Clare, but which actually was owned by the Schumann-Heink Corporation.

[227]

Clare testified that he was instructed by appellant to so deliver this stock as collateral to the bank, while appellant denied that he ever gave such instruction or that he knew anything about the deposit having been made until some time thereafter. There was testimony on the part of officials of the bank to the effect that a considerable time after the stock had been deposited with them they sent for appellant and told him they could sell the stock at $200 per share, and he told them to sell it, which they did, crediting the amount received to appellant’s personal indebtedness to the bank.

Defendant and appellant was indicted, charged with grand theft, and the case was tried upon the theory that the theft was of the character described as embezzlement. Clare was also indicted for the same offense.

Appellant relies upon the following points for a reversal of the judgment:

People v. Schumann-Heink

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Opinion — Conrey

CONREY, P. J.

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Concurrence — Houses

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