Meyer v. Johnson

WORKS, P. J.

The complaint in this action purports to state two causes of action, each designed to recover on one of two policies of life insurance. We shall treat the controversy, in our discussion of it, as if there were but one cause of action, as the questions presented by the appeal are identical as to each of the two alleged causes.

Among other things it is alleged in the pleading of plaintiffs that Mary Meyer is administratrix of the estate of Hazel Edna Johnson, deceased, and the guardian of Robert William Paul, all as stated in the title to the action; that Robert Paul is a minor, the only living child and heir at law of Hazel Johnson; that on or about April 21, 1926, there was issued by defendant life insurance company and delivered to Hazel Johnson and defendant Granville William Johnson,

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her husband, a policy of insurance on the life of Hazel payable to Granville; that on or about May 2, 1926, Granville did unlawfully and feloniously kill and murder Hazel; that he was arrested, tried and convicted of the murder, in Arizona, and that judgment of death was pronounced by the court against him. .Judgment is prayed in the complaint here that the face of the policy and interest thereon be by defendant life insurance company paid to the estate of Hazel, for the benefit of the plaintiff Paul.

Defendant life insurance company interposed an answer to the complaint, in which it pleaded both defensive and affirmative matter.

At the trial objection was made to the reception of evidence to support the allegations of the complaint on the ground that the pleading did not state a cause of action. The objection was sustained and judgment went for defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.

When the beneficiary under a life insurance policy murders the insured he cannot recover on the instrument. This rule is based upon public policy and is supported by a multitude of cases extending over a widespread jurisdiction, so much so that it is unnecessary to refer to any of them.

The question presented for our decision is whether the avails of the policies here in question have become, because of the murder of the insured by the beneficiary, a part of her estate and therefore, ultimately, the property of the minor Paul, her sole heir, it being conceded in the briefs that he is not an heir of the beneficiary. The authorities on one side of this question are quite numerous and thoroughly convincing. It can hardly be said that any eases cited by respondent really oppose them. The authorities first mentioned support the sensible view that the fund here in question is a part of Hazel Edna Johnson’s estate. It is contended that those cited by respondent take the very unsatisfactory view that the fund goes on to the heirs of her murderer, despite the fact that it can never become a part of his estate. It is to be observed here that it appears from remarks in the briefs that the sentence of death passed upon Johnson was commuted to life imprisonment and that he is now confined in a penitentiary in Arizona.