Estate of Morgan

CRAIL, J., pro tem.

On August 7, 1925, special letters of administration were issued to Henry H. Matthieson and two others. The petition for' appointment was signed by appellants, G. R. Dexter and Raymond S. Taylor, as attorneys for the petitioners. They appeared at the hearing and became attorneys of record. Shortly after the death of the decedent, Henry H. Matthieson filed of record certain deeds in favor of his wife and others, which had been placed in his hands for that purpose by the decedent. The other administrators and their attorneys, appellants herein, believing that the deeds were invalid for failure of delivery, brought an action to quiet title against the grantees and included, as one of the defendants, the said Matthieson, both as administrator and in his individual capacity. Thereupon, and on September 5, 1925, said Matthieson, “having lost confidence in” appellants as his attorneys, employed the respondent Arthur G. Baker. At all times thereafter respondent represented said Matthieson, with the knowledge of appellants, but no formal substitution of attorneys was entered on the record; and it is the contention

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of appellants that respondent acted merely as attorney for Matthieson in his individual capacity.

On December 27, 1926, after a full hearing, the court made an order settling the final account of the two special administrators, overruling certain objections which were filed by Matthieson, administrator, and in the same order made an allowance to respondent, as attorney for Matthieson, of a sum equal to one-fourth the sum which it allowed to appellants. It is from this order that the appeal is taken.

There was some sparring for position by attorneys on both sides in the trial court for the reason that each was accusing the other of unethical conduct in representing adverse interests. But no adverse interest seems to have suffered by reason of the alleged betrayals of trust, and no such claim is now made; nor is such a question before us for review. When stripped of unpleasant personalities and acrimonious aspersions at the conduct and motives of the respective parties, freely hurled at each other in the briefs, the questions for determination lend themselves more readily to solution.

It is first contended by appellants that under the facts and circumstances in evidence the respondent never was attorney for Matthieson, as special administrator. But there is substantial evidence in the record that respondent did so act during the entire period covered by the order. This is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court and vre would not be justified in setting aside its order in this regard.