Manchester Moneta Avenue State Bank v. Smith

WOOD, J.,

pro

tem.

On the day of the trial of this action before any evidence was offered defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings. This motion was denied, whereupon plaintiffs presented a similar motion, which was granted, and this appeal is prosecuted from the judgment thereafter rendered. Criticism is directed to the complaint on the ground that the allegations are incomplete, uncertain and made up largely of conclusions. Such defects as appear in the complaint may be disregarded for the reason that the judgment must be reversed, even though every allegation criticised be considered as having been made in proper form. In the complaint it is set forth: That plaintiff bank “had advanced to C. S. Summar a sum in excess of $19,000, a portion of which is represented by certain promissory notes heretofore executed in favor of Manchester Moneta Avenue State Bank, and the remainder of which was advanced by J. C. Smith personally”; that “to better secure the payment of the debts heretofore mentioned,” Summar procured the assignment of certain leases covering the land described in the complaint to be made to J. G. Smith to be by him held in trust for the use and benefit of the plaintiff bank; that said Smith entered into possession of the premises; that the leases so assigned provided that the lessees must perform certain drilling work for oil, and in ease of their failure to do so the lessors could forfeit the leases upon notice of thirty days; that such notice had been given and thirty days were about to elapse; that a large amount of money had been spent by plaintiffs in the prosecution of drilling work, and valuable equipment had been placed on the land; that defendants, with intent to force plaintiffs to forfeit the leases, had obtained possession of the equipment and had refused to permit plaintiffs to enter upon the land; that no portion of the said indebtedness to plaintiffs had been paid; that “defendants are not financially able to be responsible for damages in the event said lands should be valuable for oil development”; that the equipment on the land had been

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bought by plaintiff Smith and defendant Summar by a “purchase lease” under which title was reserved in the seller, and that this lease had been assigned to plaintiff Gonsalves; that plaintiff Smith “had leases similar in terms with the lease” covering the land in litigation, which leases would be “forfeited automatically with the forfeit of the lease described in the complaint” for the reason that the last mentioned lease was “what is commonly called a ‘Key Lease’ ” upon which development should be made. On these allegations plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the possession of said land and equipment.