In Re Stanley

California Court of Appeal Mar 14, 1928 No. Docket No. 1628.Published

Before: Craig

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that a conviction for receiving stolen property is void when the defendant was not charged with that offense and was acquitted of the only crimes charged (grand theft and violation of the Motor Vehicle Act).

Issues

Whether a defendant can be convicted of receiving stolen property when not charged with that offense and acquitted of the charged crimes.
Whether a writ of habeas corpus is available to a petitioner who has a pending appeal when the judgment is void on its face.

Disposition. Writ granted; petitioner discharged.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The crime of larceny is distinct from that of receiving stolen goods, and proof of the latter crime is insufficient to convict a person who is accused of the former”

“the verdict and judgment which apparently were founded solely upon evidence of having received stolen property, were void, since the petitioner was not charged with the offense last mentioned.”

“From the face of the record we conclude that the verdict was a nullity, and the court was plainly without jurisdiction to sentence the accused.”

CRAIG, J.

The petitioner herein, together with two others, was charged by information with having committed grand theft in the county of Los Angeles in that they “did unlawfully take away a certain Chevrolet automobile,”

[133]

and by a second count of said information they were charged with having violated section 146 of the California Vehicle Act (Stats. 1923, p. 564), it being alleged therein that they “did wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously drive a certain motor-vehicle, to wit, a Chevrolet automobile, which was then and there the personal property of one E. R. Plummer, in the absence and without the consent of said owner, E. R. Plummer, and with intent then and there to deprive the said E. R. Plummer of his title to, and possession of, said motor vehicle." All three of the defendants pleaded not guilty, and as to petitioner the jury returned verdicts of guilty of receiving stolen property, and not guilty of either grand theft or violation of section 146 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Thereafter sentence was imposed upon the verdict rendered.

On February 14, 1928, Stanley appealed, asserting, among other grounds for reversal, that the court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment. On February 24, 1928, this proceeding in

habeas corpus

was commenced by petitioner, alleging the foregoing facts as to criminal charges, acquittal thereof, and conviction of the crime of receiving stolen property. The petitioner relies upon the claim that the crime of receiving stolen property is not included within either of the offenses charged, and that the judgment is therefore void for want of jurisdiction. Respondents interpose a preliminary objection to consideration of the petition that since an appeal has been taken and is pending this court is without authority to discharge the petitioner on a writ of

habeas corpus. France

Superior Court,

201 Cal. 122 [52 A. L. R. 869, 255 Pac. 815], is cited as sustaining this contention. In this they are quite in error. In a single sentence the opinion in that case leaves no room for doubt that its holding has no application to this court. Its language is:

In Re Stanley

AI Brief

CRAIG, J.

More from California Court of Appeal

Related research

AI Brief