Hay v. McDonald
Before: James
Synopsis
Banks and Banking—Contract of Cashier.—A memorandum in the form of an “I. O. U./’ written on the back of a blank cheek and signed “B. MeD., Cashier,” does not in itself appear to be the contract of the bank.
Id. — Contracts ■— Parties and Signatures Descriptive Words.— Where, in the body of an instrument, no words appear to define the agreement as made on behalf of a party other than he whose signature is attached, it will not be deemed to be the contract of another, though there appear after the signature such qualifying or descriptive words as “President,” “Secretary,” or “Cashier.”
Id.—Parol Evidence to Identify Party.—In such cases parol evidence is admissible to identify the party against whom the obligation is legally chargeable.
Id.—Nonsuit-—Beview of Judgment—Construction of Testimony.— In reviewing a judgment entered on motion for a nonsuit, any reasonable construction may be given plaintiff’s testimony which will sustain the cause of action alleged.
[205]
JAMES, J.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover upon an agreement alleged to have been made by defendant, and which was expressed in writing and in the following form:
“Bakersfield, Mar. 29-07.
“I. 0. U.
“One Thousand dollars on completion of sale of lots 3 & 4 in Block 273 in City of Bakersfield.
“R. McDonald,
“Cashier.”
Other facts explanatory of the cause of action as alleged were: that the plaintiff had performed and rendered valuable services to defendant in negotiating the sale of the lots of land described in the contract, and that the sale of the real property had been completed prior to the commencement of the action; that defendant had, upon demand being made therefor, refused to pay plaintiff the one thousand dollars, or any part thereof. In the answer of defendant issue was taken as to all of the material allegations of the complaint. The cause came on for trial and after hearing the testimony of the plaintiff, and considering certain documentary evidence, the trial judge granted the motion of defendant that a judgment of nonsuit be entered. From the judgment so entered this appeal has been taken .
By the bill of exceptions, in which the evidence is set forth in narrative form, it appears that plaintiff was engaged by one Mr. Redlick to secure for the latter a piece of property suitable to the erection of a store building; that the lots mentioned in the agreement we have referred to were examined, and being satisfactory as to location, Redlick told the plaintiff that he would purchase them if the price was satisfactory ; that plaintiff visited one Weill, who was the owner of the ground, and that Weill stated that he would accept eighteen thousand dollars for it, and allow five per cent commission to plaintiff on the sale; that plaintiff communicated the amount of the price asked to Redlick, and Redlick said he would not pay that amount, but would pay sixteen thousand dollars ; that Redlick told plaintiff that he would not pay any commission, but that if plaintiff made anything on the transaction he must get it from the party from whom the property was purchased; that plaintiff then told Weill that he had a purchaser willing to pay sixteen thousand dollars for the lots, but
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