In Re Snyder
Before: Curtis
CURTIS, J.
Application for writ of
habeas corpus
by petitioner, who claims that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the sheriff and jailer of the county of Los Angeles. The petition shows that Leslie G. Snyder, the petitioner, is confined in the county jail of said county, charged with the commission of a felony. He admits that his detention is legal, but claims that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty in that he is prevented by said sheriff and jailer from privately consulting with his attorney in preparing for
[698]
his defense in said action, and that he is only permitted to consult with his attorney in the presence of numerous other attorneys and clients and other persons, who, on account of their proximity, are able to overhear conversations between petitioner and. his counsel. And furthermore, that respondents refuse to permit petitioner to confer with his attorney, save from across a table and through a close mesh steel wire screen, through which it is impossible to clearly observe facial expressions, read or sign papers, or to do the acts necessary to be done between petitioner and his counsel in the preparation of petitioner’s defense.
Petitioner asks that a reasonable opportunity be afforded him to consult privately with his counsel and to prepare for his defense.
The return, after setting forth the charge upon which petitioner is held, in substance denies that petitioner has been refused permission to consult privately with his attorney or to prepare for his defense. It admits that the petitioner and all other prisoners confined in the county jail, when in consultation with their attorneys, are required to communicate with them across a table and through a wire mesh screen, between such prisoners and their attorneys, but denies that said screen is of such a character as to prevent parties conversing through the same from clearly observing one another, and alleges that such screen furnishes but slight obstruction to persons conversing through it. The return further asserts that the petitioner has personally never made any objection to the conditions under which he has been obliged to communicate with his counsel, but that the attorney of petitioner, without any demand for a fuller opportunity to communicate privately with petitioner, arbitrarily declined to communicate with him for the sole reason that said table and said screen were between her and her client.
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