Berry v. Crowell

JAMES, J.

Plaintiffs appeal from an adverse judgment. The appeal is presented by the alternative method. The questions argued relate to orders of the trial judge vacating certain default entries made by the clerk of the court; it is also contended that neither the findings nor the pleadings sustain the judgment and that prejudicial error was committed by the court in denying a motion to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint at the trial.

The controversy arose as a result of an exchange of real properties which was had between parties to the action. Plaintiffs were the owners of eighty acres of land in the state of Texas. Defendants were the owners of a lot in the city of Riverside, California. Plaintiff C. F. Berry was, at the time of the transaction, a resident of the city of Riverside. W. E. Berry, a son, was part owner in the Texas land, and he resided outside of the state of California. The entire transaction, in so far as the plaLmu were concerned, appears to have been conducted by C. F. Berry. The complaint in this action stated a cause of action to rescind the contract of exchange upon the ground of alleged fraudulent representations made by defendant George W. Crowell respecting the value of the Riverside property. It was alleged that C. F. Berry was a farmer by occupation and was ignorant of the values of property in the city of Riverside, and that he was “easily led, imposed upon, eircum

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vented, and overcome by cunning, artifice, and undue influence”; it was alleged that George W. Crowell falsely and fraudulently represented that his property in the city of Riverside was of the value of $6,000 and that “plaintiff could rely absolutely upon defendant’s statement as to said value because defendant was well posted as to property values in said city and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff or his son to make any investigation for themselves”; it was alleged that in fact the Riverside property was not worth in excess of the sum of $3,250,. all of which the defendant George W. Crowell well knew at the time he made the aforesaid representations. Preliminarily, the plaintiffs alleged that both Crowell and C. F. Berry were members of a religious organization and that defendant George W. Crowell was an elder of the church. The second allegation contained in the complaint is as follows: “That the office of elder, in said religious organization, is by said organization conferred only upon one whose Christianity is unquestioned, and whose integrity is unimpeachable, and according to the doctrine of said organization, the statements and representations of. an elder in said organization are entitled to full faith and credit.” Immediately following this allegation the complaint charges that Crowell “in addition to the duties imposed upon him by said religious organization, also is, by profession, a trader “in lands and property of all kinds, and is an artful and shrewd business man of large experience.” There is the further allegation that Berry was induced to rely upon the statements of Crowell by reason of the fact that the men “were brothers together, in said church.” Defendants admitted that Crowell held the office in the church and that it was of the character alleged, but denied that the statements or representations of an elder in the organization were entitled to any more credit than that of other members. The answer in its further allegations, affirmative and of denial, tendered an issue as to all of the fraudulent acts alleged, and affirmed that no representations as to the value of defendants’ land were made except that George W. Crowell stated that said land “stood him” about the sum of $5,660, and in this connection it was affirmed that such representation was true. The trial judge generally found the facts to be against the allegations of the complaint and the findings contained