Cook v. Reid
Before: Conrey
Synopsis
Schools—Warrant Against School Funds—Duty op Auditor.—The duty of the auditor to draw a warrant against the school funds of a district is limited under section 1543 of the Political Code to cases where “he allows said demand.”
Id.—Warrants in Favor op Teachers—-Construction—Section 1543, Political Code.—Section 1543 of the Political Code, which, as amended, transfers the duty of drawing warrants from the superintendent of schools to the county auditor, must be read together with section 1700 of the same code which provides that “no warrant must be drawn in favor of any teacher, unless the officer whose duty it is to draw such warrant is satisfied that the teacher has faithfully performed all the duties prescribed in section sixteen, hundred and ninety-six.”
Id.—Auditor’s Duty Discretionary.—The duty of the auditor with respect to demands of teachers is discretionary and not merely ministerial.
Mandamus—Enforcement of Discretionary Power—Abuse of Discretion.—Where the officer’s duty in such respect is discretionary, mandamus will not lie to compel Mm to draw the warrant unless an abuse of discretion has been shown.
Id.—Burden of Showing Abuse of Discretion.—In a proceeding by mandamus to enforce a particular action by a public officer, where the official duty is discretionary, the burden of showing abuse of discretion is upon the petitioner.
Id.—Pleading — Demurrer Properly Sustained Without Leave to Amend.—In this proceeding to compel a county auditor to allow and indorse and to draw a warrant for a claim wMch had been allowed by the county superintendent of schools, where the petitioner’s complaint did not show what service or other consideration was the foundation of his claim, and did not allege any fact from which an abuse of discretion could be inferred, the trial court did not err in sustaining a demurrer to the petition without leave to amend.
CONREY, P. J.
The court below, having first sustained defendant’s demurrer to the petition herein without leave to amend, entered judgment denying the plaintiff’s petition for a writ of mandate. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment.
The facts set forth in the several counts of the petition are all alike, except that each cause of action is based upon a different demand. For the sake of brevity, we will discuss the case upon the first count alone as if it were all of the complaint.
In substance, the allegations are as follows: The plaintiff is, and at all times named in the complaint he was,
[455]
the owner and holder of a certain order and requisition of the Rannell’s School District, county of Riverside, dated May 11, 1916, payable to W. H. Cook or order, for the sum of $75 from the school fund of said district, and signed by two trustees of said district on that date. On June 30, 1916, the plaintiff presented said order to the superintendent of schools of the county of Riverside, who thereupon duly examined and approved the same in writing by indorsing upon said order: “Examined and approved, numbered as above, Jun. 30,1916, ’ ’ and affixed his signature thereto as county superintendent of schools and thereupon drew said requisition on said auditor as such. On the sixth day of September, 1916, the plaintiff presented said requisition to the defendant as auditor of said county at his office; thereupon the defendant refused to allow and indorse the same and refused to draw his warrant in favor of the plaintiff for the amount stated in the order and requisition, although sufficient funds are available therefor.
The right claimed by plaintiff depends upon certain provisions of the Political Code. Section 1543 (as amended, Stats. 1915, p. 746) : “It is the duty of the superintendent of schools of each county: . . . Third, (a) On the order of the board of school trustees ... to draw his requisition upon the county auditor for all necessary expenses against the school fund of any district. . . . Each requisition must specify the purpose for which it is drawn, but no requisition shall be drawn upon the order of the board of school trustees . . . against the funds of any district except the teachers’ or janitors’ salaries, unless such order is accompanied by an itemized bill showing the separate items, and the price of each, in payment for which the order is drawn; nor shall any requisition for teachers’ or janitors’ salaries be drawn unless the order shall state the monthly salary of teacher or janitor, and name the months for which such salary is due. Upon the receipt of such requisition the auditor shall draw his warrant upon the county treasurer in favor of the parties for the amount stated in such requisition. The order of the board of school trustees . . . when signed 'by at least two members of the board of trustees, . . . shall be transmitted to the superintendent, who shall, in case he approve said demand, indorse upon it, ‘Examined and approved,’ together with the number and date when approved,
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