Brigden v. Dodge

JAMES, J.

Plaintiffs, having recovered a judgment against the county of Los Angeles for a sum of money, brought this proceeding in the superior court to compel the supervisors of said county and the other disbursing officers named, to audit, allow, and pay the amount of said judg

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ment from the general fund of the county. Mandate was decreed agreeable to the prayer of the complaint and the defendants have appealed. - The judgment-roll alone constitutes the record on appeal.

In 1912 the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County, acting under authority of an act to provide for the improvement of channels of innavigable streams and watercourses, as the same was approved in 1895 (Stats. 1895, p. 247) and amended in 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 446), adopted a resolution by which a district was described under the name of Fair Oaks Protection District, and proceeded, further to have surveys made and to provide for the doing of certain work and the assessment of the cost thereof against the property within said district. However, the board of supervisors did not proceed regularly with its action, but let con-' tracts for work before commissioners had been appointed. Such procedure was not in accordance with the requirements of the act referred to. The case thus made was the same as that considered in

Pasadena Park Improvement Co. et al.

v.

Lelande,

175 Cal. 511, [166 Pac. 341], There it was held that the acts of the board of supervisors in ordering the doing of protection work and in levying assessments to pay the cost thereof were void. Plaintiffs having paid assessments levied against their property, located within the said Fair Oak Protection District, brought an action to recover back the money and obtained a judgment against the county, which judgment was general in its form without limiting or restricting terms as to the fund from which it was to be paid. Being a general judgment against the county, its payment would ordinarily be made from the county’s common or general fund. In due course the plaintiffs presented their demand to the. board of supervisors in their effort to collect upon the judgment and the board allowed the demand, but ordered that it should be paid from the Fair Oaks Protection District improvement fund. At the time the demand of plaintiffs was so allowed no money was shown upon the books of the auditor and treasurer to the credit of the fund named, and no money was thereafter credited to that fund. As it appeared that there was ample money in the general fund of the county, plaintiffs insisted that their demand should be paid, and petitioned the superior court for the