Frisbee v. O'Connor
Before: Spence
[602]
SPENCE, J.
—Plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer of the city of Beverly Hills, sought to enjoin defendant, the city treasurer of the city of Beverly Hills, from paying a warrant in favor of the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company in ■the sum of $315.26 for the first year’s premium due upon an insurance policy issued by said company to Charles Gouts Blair, an employee of said city. The trial court overruled the demurrer interposed by defendant and upon the failure of said defendant to answer, granted the injunction. Defendant appeals upon the judgment-roll.
The policy was issued to said' employee under the provisions of Ordinance 244 as passed by the city council in 1928. That ordinance was one “providing for the creation and operation of an insurance plan and pension fund for employees of said city”. The ordinance attempted to work out a system of insurance and pensions^ for the employees of the city through the means of individual policies issued to said employees by the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company “or such reputable insurer” as might thereafter be designated by four-fifths vote of the city council. Briefly describing the plan appellant states that “the ordinance provides for insurance and a unit of pension at age 65 for each employee dependent upon the amount of his remuneration and the length of his service with the city, payments of premium to be made the first year by the city and thereafter seventy-five per cent (75%) by the city and twenty-five per cent (25%) by the employee, the policy at all times having a cash value to the employee equal to all money paid in by him with interest at four per cent (4%) ”.
The main question involved in this appeal is whether the city of Beverly Hills had the power to pass the ordinance and incur the liability in question. Conceding that the city had no - express power to do so, appellant contends that it acted within its implied powers, but in our opinion this contention cannot be sustained. It is fundamental that a municipal corporation can exercise only such powers as have been conferred upon it by the Constitution, the general laws or its own charter provisions (18 Cal. Jur. 798), and' that the language purporting to define its powers must be strictly construed. (18 Cal. Jur. 801.) As the city of Beverly Hills is a city of the sixth class under the general laws and,
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