Bar Association of S. F. v. Goldman
Before: THE COURT. —
Synopsis
APPLICATION for the disbarment of an attorney at law.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
THE COURT.
This is an application by the Bar Association of San Francisco to remove and disbar defendant as an attorney and counsel at law. Two charges are contained in the accusation: (1) Moral turpitude of the accused in filing with the Industrial Accident Commission a document purporting to be a satisfaction and release in full of an award made by such commission, together with a demand for entry of such satisfaction thereon, whereas said award was not satisfied in full but only a part paid thereon; (2) moral turpitude of the accused in testifying under oath before said commission as having paid the award in full, whereas he only paid a part thereof.
The facts giving rise to the accusation may be summarized as follows: On the seventeenth day of January, 1917, one P. J. Healy, a carpenter, was working on a building owned by I. Goldman, the father of the accused, and during the course of such employment Healy claimed that he sustained certain injuries to his knee. Demand was made by Healy upon Goldman for damages, whereupon Goldman in settle
[43]
ment of the claim paid the ■ hospital and other expenses incurred by Healy together with certain sums of money amounting in all to over $300. Notwithstanding this settlement Healy thereafter made further demands upon Goldman, who agreed to pay some further sum, but before the matter could be adjusted Healy filed with the Industrial Accident Commission his written claim for compensation for the injuries alleged to have been received. The accused filed an answer on behalf of his father, and thereafter represented him throughout the proceedings before said commission. Healy recovered an award in the sum of $1,290, less the sum of $203, that Goldman was given credit for, leaving a balance of $1,087. Thereafter and upon receiving information from Healy’s physician and nurse that the injury complained of had not been suffered by Healy upon the occasion claimed, but at some previous time, Goldman filed a petition for rehearing before the commission. The petition was granted, but the commission upon rehearing refused to disturb the original finding. Thereafter and upon the conclusion of the case before the commission the accused, as attorney for his father, filed with the Industrial Accident Commission a written document signed by Healy entitled “satisfaction of judgment.” It was recited therein that payment of the full sum of $1,087 had been made by I. Goldman to Healy in accordance with the award. Thereafter Healy filed an affidavit with the commission stating that he had in fact settled the case for $800 and had only received that sum instead of $1,087, the amount of the award, and that he had been advised by Ms attorneys not to regard the settlement as conclusive, and requested that the satisfaction be set aside. The commission set the matter for hearing, upon which occasion the accused testified that he had paid Healy the full sum of $1,087. The commission determined the question adversely to Goldman’s contention, and in the exercise of the paternal supervision granted to it under the statute set the satisfaction of judgment aside and awarded Healy the further sum of $287.
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