Luitwieler v. Luitwieler

STURTEVANT, J.

This is an appeal from an order restraining the defendant. The order was issued pending the hearing of a divorce ease. What cause of action is pleaded in the divorce case does not appear. The appellant has brought up the order, his notice of appeal therefrom, and the bill of exceptions. The order appealed from might more properly be termed five several orders all contained in

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one paper. We have inserted our own numbering, but otherwise the charging part of the orders is as follows:

“1. It is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that said defendant, until the further order of this Court, be and .he is hereby ordered to forthwith vacate the residence of plaintiff known and designated by number and street as No. 2114 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, California ;

“2.

It is Further Hereby Ordered that defendant refrain from, either directly or indirectly, disturbing, speaking to or writing to, or in any other manner communicating with plaintiff until the further order of this Court;

“3. And It is Further Hereby Ordered that defendant may lock the room in said premises wherein his personal belongings are contained, and retain the key to said room;

“4. And It is Further Hereby Ordered that said defendant shall forthwith deliver to counsel for plaintiff the key to the front door of said premises and any other keys that will give defendant ingress to said premises, or any part or portion thereof;

“5. It is Further Hereby Ordered that C. A. Rees, as Receiver, appointed by this Court in action No. B-83955, in Interlocutory Decree entered therein, be and he is hereby required to pay to the defendant herein the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per month upon the first day of each and every month until the further order of this Court, and charge the same to said defendant in said action, relating back to and commencing with the first day of September, 1921.”

The appellant concedes that the second order was within the power of the trial court. Therefore it is eliminated from attack. The third order appears on its face to be a permission granted to the defendant and was not adverse to him. The fifth order may also be said to be a permission granted to the defendant and not an order adverse to him. Therefore, we will address ourselves to orders one (1) and four (4). Those two orders are, in legal effect, a direction that the defendant forthwith deliver the outside door keys to the plaintiff and thereafter to remain away from the residence of the plaintiff until the further order of the court. From the bill of exceptions it appears that