Ranagan v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n

ARCHBALD, J.,

pro

tem.

The testatrix, Carrie J. Norrish, a resident of Long Beach, died on or about May 25, 1932, leaving a witnessed will dated November 9, 1925, which gave to the children of her deceased brother, Alfred B. Coe, all the residue and remainder of her estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts, and also a codicil thereto, executed April 27, 1931, entirely in her own handwriting and on three separate sheets of paper. In addition to a bequest of certain personal belongings to decedent’s friend, Mrs. Elizabeth Knowles, the codicil contained the following provision: “To my kind friend Mrs. Banagan I want given any thing I have bought while in the house & any of my clothing

&

she wishes & personal property.” The will and codicil were admitted to probate June 27, 1932, and letters testamentary were issued the same day to Bank of America- National Trust & Savings Association, named in the will as executor. On November 13, 1932, Algernon S. Coe, alleging himself to be a beneficiary under said last will and testament, filed a petition for an interpretation of that part of the codicil making a bequest to Mrs. Banagan, alleging that such bequest was vague and uncertain as to what such bequest and the personal property mentioned consisted of, and that a controversy had arisen as to the proper interpretation thereof. On December 15, 1932, judgment was rendered by the superior court construing said bequest to read as follows: “There is bequeathed to Mrs. Ednah Banagan such articles of clothing and household effects as said Ednah Banagan desires, other than articles therein specifically bequeathed to other parties.” Deeming herself aggrieved by such judgment, Ednah Banagan has appealed therefrom.

[168]

Appellant contends (1) that the words “personal property” have a well-defined meaning and cannot be restricted to articles of clothing and household effects, and apparently that they are intended to cover all property in the estate that could be designated “personal property”; (2) that if there is any ambiguity the court can only determine the true intention of the testatrix after taking evidence concerning the making of such codicil.