Lewis v. City & County of San Francisco
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
Action to Recover Money Paid—Illegal Tax upon Estate—Filing op Inventory—Compulsion—Support op Finding—Appeal—Absence op Evidence.—In an action to recover money paid to the county clem as an illegal tax, under compulsion, to secure the filing of an inventory and appraisement of the estate of a deceased person, a finding that the payment was involuntary and compulsory must be held upon appeal to have been sustained by the evidence, in the absence of a bill of exceptions containing the evidence before the court.
Id.—Sufficiency op Complaint—Ultimate and Probative Facts.— Though the allegation in the complaint that the payment was involuntary is of an ultimate fact to be found by the court, upon which the plaintiff’s right of recovery depends, yet the sufficiency of the complaint is to be determined by the probative facts pleaded, which support such ultimate fact.
Id.—Exaction of Illegal Pees as a Condition op Filing Document— Compulsory Payment—Remedy by Mandamus Inadequate.—The exaction by a clerk or other official, against the protest of a party, of illegal fees as a condition of filing a document in his office which such party is entitled to have filed, renders the payment of such fees compulsory, notwithstanding such party could have procured a writ of mandate compelling the officer to file the document without paying the fees demanded. The right to file the document was immediate; and the payment of the fee under the alternative of bringing such action and incurring the expense and delay thereof is not voluntary.
Id.—Action Against City and County—Interest not Allowable Before Judgment.—Where the county clerk had paid the illegal tax exacted into the treasury of the city and county and the action to recover it is against the county, no interest is allowable therein before the entry of judgment.
Id.—Petition to Modify Judgment as to Interest—Point not Urged upon Hearing—Right op Court.—This court has the right to decide any point before the judgment becomes final, and will do so after its opinion has been filed,- affirming the judgment, when its attention- is called to the fact that the judgment upon its face contravenes a statute or a well-established rule of law; and the fact that appellant did not urge upon the hearing of the appeal that the allowance of interest before judgment was improper will not prevent the granting of appellant’s petition to modify the judgment in that respect.
Opinion
The plaintiffs, as executors of the last will and testament of Miranda W. Lux, deceased, presented to the county clerk of the city and county of San Francisco an inventory and appraisement of the estate of their testatrix on July 31, 1895, and requested him to file the same. The clerk refused to receive or file the document unless the plaintiffs would first pay to him the sum of $770 as a fee therefor. This demand was made by reason of the provisions of section 163 of the act entitled: "An act to establish a uniform system of county and township governments," approved March 24, 1893. (Stats. 1893, p. 389, c. 234.) The plaintiffs protested against the said demand, claiming the right to have the inventory and appraisement filed by him without the payment of any fee in addition to what they had already paid; but, notwithstanding said protest, the clerk refused to receive or file the same or permit it to be filed except upon the prepayment of said sum of money. By reason of such refusal, and in order to enable them to continue in the exercise of their official duties as such executors, the plaintiffs thereupon paid said fee to the clerk, and it was by him paid into the city and county treasury. The act under which the said fee was demanded was thereafter declared invalid (Fatjo v. Pfister, 117 Cal. 83, [48 P. 1012]), and the plaintiff thereupon brought the present action to recover the money so paid by them. The cause was tried by the court, and in addition to the above facts the court found, in accordance with allegations in the complaint, that the payment of said money by the plaintiffs "was wholly involuntary and compulsory on the part of said executors; that the said executors could not otherwise than by making such payment procure the acceptance of said return or the filing of said inventory and appraisement; that if they had not paid the said pretended additional fee and illegal tax of $770, in accordance with the aforesaid *Page 114 demand of said clerk, he would not have received or filed the said inventory and appraisement, or permitted the same to be filed in said court, and there would not and could not have been any effectual return of said inventory and appraisement within the time required by law or at any time or at all; and that by reason of the nonreturn thereof the said executors would have become prima facie liable to removal from their office as such executors, and to other penalties under the statutes in such case made and provided, and could not have escaped said liability except by pleading and proving the facts." Judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant has appealed therefrom upon the judgment-roll alone without any bill of exceptions.
In the absence of a bill of exceptions containing the evidence before the court, the finding that the payment was involuntary and compulsory must be held to have been sustained by the evidence. It is, however, contended by the appellant that the complaint is insufficient; that the averment therein that the payment was involuntary is only a legal conclusion, and that the facts connected with the payment as set forth in the complaint from which that conclusion is drawn show that the payment was voluntary. Whether the payment was voluntary or involuntary was an ultimate fact to be found by the court from the evidence presented at the trial, and the allegation in the complaint that it was involuntary was an allegation of the ultimate fact upon which the plaintiffs' right of recovery depended; but, as in the case of a cause of action depending upon fraud or negligence, the allegation of this ultimate fact would have been insufficient against a general demurrer unless supported by an averment of the probative facts, and the sufficiency of the complaint is therefore to be determined by a consideration of these probative facts.
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