Alper v. Tormey
Before: McLaughlin
Synopsis
Sale of Stock-Yard by Assignee of Insolvent—Dispute as to Fixtures—Compromise—Conveyance—Becitals—Steel Bails not Included.—Where the assignee of an insolvent corporation sold its stock-yard with all buildings, structures, tracks, and appurtenances, and where, upon a dispute as to whether certain articles were ‘ ‘ personal property not sold, ’ ’ or were ‘ ‘ fixtures, ’ ’ a compromise was allowed pursuant to a stipulation referring it to the court, which permitted an admission in the conveyance that all property in and about the premises shall pass as fixtures with the realty; held, that a conveyance reciting a sale of “all property used in connection with” the stock-yard company, and an agreement that all “personal property in and about the buildings is to be considered as fixtures,” did not pass sixty tons of steel rails not on the premises, and far removed from any buildings or tracks, of the existence of which the assignee was ignorant, and which were not included in the stipulation referring the dispute, and were listed for taxation by the vendee as “old iron.”
McLAUGHLIN, J.
This is an action to recover sixty tons of steel rails. At the time the action was commenced the property in controversy was in the possession of defendant Tormey, but at the trial he expressly disclaimed all interest in the rails. Subsequent to the commencement of the action defendant Wittenmyer, as assignee of the Union Stock Yard Company, an insolvent debtor, filed his complaint in intervention and set up his claim to the possession and ownership of
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said rails as such assignee. Judgment was entered in favor of the intervener, and plaintiffs appeal from an order denying their motion for a new trial. Appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings, and the question thus presented, boiled down to its essence, involves the ownership of the rails here in controversy. It is admitted that the rails were owned by the insolvent corporation, and passed to the intervener by virtue of the assignment to him. But it is claimed that they were included in a sale of certain property of such corporation made by the assignee to plaintiff Alper. At the time the action was commenced, the rails were lying upon land owned by defendant Tormey. They had been brought there and, as he put it, “stored” on the land with his consent. The Union Stock Yard Company owned a plant which covered about thirty-five acres, and in connection therewith operated spur tracks which passed over Tormey’s land. These rails were not laid, but were lying on the ground about fifty feet from such tracks, at a point about three hundred feet from the line of the Union Stock Yard Company’s property. The undisputed facts touching the sale out of which this litigation arose may be briefly stated as follows:—
On November 12, 1900, the intervener, as assignee, sold to plaintiff Alper, all the right, title, and interest of said insolvent, and said assignee in and to certain blocks of land in Rodeo, Contra Costa County, “together with all the buildings, machinery, and fittings, corrals, pens, sheds, and appurtenances now erected or in process of erection upon said blocks, and all and every the railroad tracks and railroad superstructures, which have heretofore been built by the Union Stock Yard Company of San Francisco, . . . and used or intended to be used in connection with the improvements and machinery in said blocks.” This sale was confirmed by the court, but disputes arose touching the payment of taxes, and “whether certain property in and upon the above-described premises and used in connection with the business formerly carried on there was
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