People v. Gilman

BURNETT, J.

Defendant was convicted of abortion and from the judgment and order denying her motion for a new trial the appeal has been taken. Some claim has been made that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and the appellant indulges in a criticism of the testimony of certain witnesses of the prosecution, claiming that in certain respects it is inconsistent and unsatisfactory.

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After a careful reading of the record, however, it must be stated that the verdict is supported in ample measure. The prosecutrix seems to have related a straightforward story that carries upon its face convincing evidence of her veracity. She manifested no unwonted hostility to the defendant, but was apparently disposed to relate all the facts of the case within her knowledge just as they transpired. It is true that her evidence alone, within the purview of the statute (Pen. Code, sec. 1108), must be corroborated in order to justify legally a conviction. That corroboration is, however, found in full measure in the record before us. We deem it unnecessary and unprofitable to set out in detail the evidence which justifies the conviction. It is sufficient to say that one Mrs. Johnson was present at the place where the offense was committed at the very time of the delivery of the foetus, and her testimony is strong and convincing as to the criminal conduct of defendant. She also related a conversation which she had with defendant which was indicative and persuasive of defendant’s guilt. It may be added that the record contains substantial, significant, and important circumstantial evidence, all tending toward the support of the verdict of the jury. Indeed, it is rare that a ease of this character is established by such a strong array of positive and circumstantial evidence. It would be singular and unexpected if

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the jury had failed to convict after a careful and conscientious consideration of the showing that was made in this case.

Viewing the whole record in the light of the strong and conclusive evidence of guilt, it could fairly be said that none of the assignments of error could have resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and, hence, we would be justified in brushing them aside as not warranting specific consideration. We have, however, examined them with some degree of care and are prepared to say that no substantial error was committed by the trial court. The defendant seems to have been granted every right to which she was entitled under the law. The trial judge conducted the proceedings cautiously, impartially, and justly. The instructions thoroughly and correctly presented the law of the case and left nothing unsaid that was necessary for the guidance of the jury in their determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It is true that certain instructions, proposed by her, were refused, but as far as correct in doctrine and applicable to the facts of the case, they were entirely covered by instructions which were- given.