Chapman v. Hughes

California Court of Appeal May 22, 1906 No. Civ. No. 21.Published

Before: McLaughlin

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Holding. The court held that a trial court has the authority to modify a cost judgment to conform to the specific directions of an appellate court's mandate, but it lacks jurisdiction to vacate cost judgments against parties whose liability was established by the appellate court's affirmance.

Issues

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to vacate a judgment for costs docketed against defendants following an appellate reversal and remand.
Whether the trial court's order vacating costs was consistent with the appellate court's prior mandate regarding the liability of specific defendants.

Disposition. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It needs no citation of authorities to show that where a judgment for costs has been docketed in conformity with rule XXIII of the supreme, court, and section 958 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court is without power to vacate”

“It follows, that so far as the order here assailed conforms to the decision of the supreme court, it is valid, and that any portion thereof contrary to such decision is void.”

Synopsis

Costs upon Appeal—Judgment op Supreme Court—Power op Trial Court.—Where, upon a judgment of reversal in the supreme court, a judgment for costs of appeal is docketed in conformity with rule XXII of that court, and section 958 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court has no power to vacate it; but in so far as it has been docketed against respondents as to whom the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, the trial court had power to set it aside, so as to make it conform to the decision upon appeal.

Id.—Judgment Appirmed in Part and Reversed in Part—Insolvency op Respondent.—Where the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, as to a particular respondent, he is liable for the costs of appeal; and his discharge in insolvency proceedings does not relieve him from such liability. In any event, the trial court was powerless to relieve him from the effect of the judgment rendered by the supreme court.

McLAUGHLIN, J.

The above-entitled actions were consolidated and tried as one, but the court in deciding, entered separate findings, judgments and decrees.

On appeal from the judgment, or judgments, so entered, the supreme court rendered two opinions, and it will be necessary to quote from each at some length in order to explain the question here presented for decision. In the main opinion

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filed April 7, 1900, the opinion in department was expressly approved and made a part of the opinion in bank, and we quote from the decision therein as follows: “It is to be remembered that while this was originally a simple action by Chapman against Hughes for an accounting, it subsequently became complicated by supplemental pleadings and the addition of new parties defendant. Of these, one was the defendant E. W. Chapman, against whom Hughes was seeking an accounting, and others were grantees and transferees of parts of the land and of mortgages, and of mortgage notes.

“Although those actions were consolidated and tried as one, and a single judgment entered, yet between these defendants there was no privity nor common interest.

It would therefore be unjust to force a defendant who has established the validity of his purchase to litigate the matter anew because the findings of the court in some other respect not material to his rights have been successfully attached.

Therefore, in subservience of the ends of justice and the rights of the parties, it is ordered that the judgments appealed from be vacated. It is further ordered that a new trial be had upon the issues touching the right of Hughes to an accounting with E. W. Chapman; that if, after such hearing, the court shall determine that Hughes is entitled to an accounting, it shall take or order taken an account, to the end that the sum found due, if any, from E. W. Chapman to Hughes, may be set off against the sum found due, if any, from Hughes to W. S. Chapman. It is further ordered and adjudged that the accounting between W. S. Chapman and Thomas E. Hughes be

affirmed

in all respects as settled by the court,

and that his sales, transfers, and assignments of parts of the land, and of the proceeds of sales of parts of the land be affirmed in all respects as found by the court, saving as to those matters and as to those findings hereinabove considered as to which it has been declared that the findings are not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

Chapman v. Hughes

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