Conrad v. La Plante

NOURSE, J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment rendered against him and in favor of plaintiff for $2,750 upon a complaint containing four causes of action, the first three of which were upon promissory notes and the fourth for money loaned to the amount of $1,500. The attack upon the judgment is confined to that portion of it which relates to the fourth cause of action.

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The facts material to the opinion are: In November, 1915, plaintiff delivered to defendant $3,000 and received

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from Mm shares of stock in the National Film Corporation of the par value of $2,000. As a part of the transaction it was agreed that the plaintiff should be employed as an actress or performer by the National Film Corporation at a salary of forty dollars per week. After plaintiff’s money had been obtained by the defendant she was employed for a period of two weeks and paid the stipulated salary. Thereupon the corporation ceased to do business and permitted its charter to lapse through its failure to pay the state license tax. In February, 1916, plaintiff called upon defendant and made a demand for the return of her money, and thereupon defendant gave her $250 in cash, the three notes which are the basis of the first three causes of action herein, amounting to $1,250, and, as the plaintiff alleged and testified, promised to give her $1,500 more. The evidence relating to the transactions in November and February is conflicting. On behalf of plaintiff it is shown that the original transaction was a loan of $2,000, evidenced by a promissory note and secured by certificates of stock of the National Film Corporation of the par value of $2,000. The second installment of $1,000 it is claimed was also loaned to defendant by plaintiff, for which she received neither note nor security. On behalf of defendant it is claimed that the original transaction was a sale of 3,000 shares of the National Film Corporation at par for the sum of $3,000, which admittedly were of no value whatever. Defendant was president of this company.

The weakness of defendant’s position in this respect is found in his own testimony to the effect that the company was at that time “broke and everybody knew it,” and that the stock was worthless; also in the testimony of one Miller, an agent of defendant, that “our company was practically broke, and we didn’t know whether we were going to get another dollar in or not; and I was broke, and everybody else was broke; so it was a very uncertain proposition.” Then the witness Hale, an employee of Parsons at the time of the original transaction, testified regarding the conversations had in his presence between defendant and Miller, as follows: “Mr. Miller said we had a sucker, in plain English, talking of a woman who got money, and going to put in so much money, lend so much money, but you have to use her. I says, Has she ever done acting?’ I was told no. I says