People v. Abbott

NOURSE, J.

The defendant was convicted upon an information charging him with the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses made with an intent to defraud. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and the order of the trial court refusing his motion for a new trial.

The appellant assigns as error the admission of evidence showing that the bail bond of defendant had been declared forfeited by the court prior to the trial and that a bench warrant had issued for his apprehension. It is admitted by the appellant that this evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that he had attempted to evade the consequences of a trial by flight, but he contends that the record evidence of the proceedings had by the court prior to the trial of the cause was not admissible for this purpose. Some authorities from other jurisdictions are cit-'d to the point that this evidence was not admissible as it covered an

ex parte

proceeding had in the absence of the defendant. But in the case before us evidence had previously been offered to show that the defendant had failed to appear at various times when his ease was called before the trial court and that six months after the date upon which his case was set for trial he was arrested in another county after considerable search. It was then shown that he was arrested upon a bench warrant which was issued'by the trial court a few weeks previous to the time when his bail was declared forfeited. The introduction of the evidence relating to the issuance of the bench warrant upon which the appellant was subsequently arrested in another county was clearly admissible as evidence of flight. The evidence relating to the forfeiture of his bail was merely a part of the general story and was not prejudicial to the trial of his case.

The second point urged is that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict because the false pretenses upon which the money was fraudulently obtained from the prosecuting witness consisted in representations that a number of barrels contained whisky, whereas, as a matter

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of fact, said barrels contained colored water. It is then argued that, inasmuch as “there are no longer any property rights in whisky,” the prosecuting witness must be presumed to have known the law to be such and could not, therefore, be deemed to have relied upon the false representations of the appellant.