In Re Estate of Vance

BISHOP, J., pro tem.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not the following provision of the will of the testatrix is sufficiently definite to create a trust:

“I hereby give ... all the rest ... of by estate . . . to my executors ... in trust, however, to be invested in Bibles, to be distributed in home and foreign lands in such quantities and in such places as may to my said executors seem best.”

[164]

If this wish of the testatrix should he given effect, the order and decree of distribution, by which the balance of her estate was divided as though she had died intestate, must be reversed. The decree must be affirmed, on the other hand, if we find the language of the will too indefinite to be a .valid disposition of her property. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the attempted creation of a trust failed for indefiniteness.

Tested by the standard required for a private trust, the attempt of the testatrix fails to establish a trust, because of the uncertainty as to beneficiaries.

(Barker

v.

Hurley,

(1901) 132 Cal. 21 [63 Pac. 1071, 64 Pac. 480].) Appellants do not question this conclusion, but rest their claim to the balance of the estate on the theory that a charitable trust was created. In such a trust, the persons constituting the beneficiaries need not be certain—indeed, should not be.

(Estate of Hinckley,

(1881) 58 Cal. 457;

Collier

v.

Lindley,

(1923) 203 Cal. 641, 652 [266 Pac. 526].) But in order that a trust may be valid as a charitable trust, its objects must be limited to those of a charitable nature.

(Estate of Sutro,

(1909) 155 Cal. 727 [102 Pac. 920].) Two short quotations in the Sutro case express its thought. The first is from