Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Autos, Inc.

SPENCE, J.

Plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover damages against defendant Carmichael’s U-Drive Autos, Inc., for personal injuries inflicted upon plaintiff when struck by an automobile belonging to defendant. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant and from the judgment entered upon the directed verdict plaintiff appeals.

The accident occurred on the evening of August 7, 1928. The driver stopped the car a short distance from the scene, disappeared without being identified» and has not been seen since. It appeared that about one hour prior to the accident defendant had rented the car to a man who gave his name as Max Watson. It is conceded that there was ample evidence to show that the driver of the car negligently drove it over the curb and struck plaintiff while he was standing on the sidewalk, but defendant based his motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that the

[350]

evidence was insufficient to go to the jury on the question of the liability of defendant as owner of the car.

At the time of the accident section 1714% of the Civil Code had not been enacted and by his complaint plaintiff sought to impose liability on defendant as owner by alleging that defendant “negligently let and hired” the automobile to Watson; that defendant “negligently permitted Watson to drive and operate said automobile upon the highway”; that “defendant knew . . . that said Max Watson was not competent to operate” said automobile; and “that said Max Watson was not licensed to drive or operate any automobile upon such highway”. In other words, the gravamen of plaintiff’s cause of action was ■. the alleged negligence in entrusting the car to Watson. These allegations of the complaint were sufficient, for it is well settled that liability may be imposed upon an owner who negligently entrusts his automobile to another.

.(Rocca,

v.

Steinmets,

61 Cal. App. 102 [214 Pac. 257], and cases cited.) Such negligence is most frequently predicated upon the fact that an owner knowingly entrusts his ear to an incompetent person, but we do not believe that the owner is liable solely in those cases where such showing is made. The charge being that of negligence, the standard by which the conduct of the owner is to be measured is the general one based upon the care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances and the question whether a particular owner’s conduct measures up to that standard is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. (19 Cal. Jur., p. 729; 42 C. J., p. 1261.)