Rikimatsu Kawamura v. Honek
Before: Stephens
STEPHENS, J., pro
tern.—This appeal comes after a trial wherein the plaintiff was awarded $3,000 as damages for a minor son’s death. Appellant makes the point that the jury
[510]
was without a necessary factor in assessing damages because, as he claims, the evidence was not sufficient for the approximation of the plaintiff’s life expectancy. Of course, the father’s life expectancy is an important element, as he was not only entitled to the son’s services and earnings during the nonage, but was entitled to such society, comfort and protection as under the circumstances obtaining could reasonably be expected from the son so long as they both should live.
(Sneed
v.
Marysville Gas etc. Co.,
149 Cal. 704 [87 Pac. 376].)
Respondent’s son was a normal, healthy boy of seventeen when the accident cost him his life. He was obedient, attended junior high school and helped his father in his work on Saturdays and at other times, but was paid nothing therefor. Respondent was a Japanese gardener, and had been caring for residential lawns for six or seven years, earning approximately $210 per month. He was injured in the accident that proved fatal to the son and was confined in a hospital for two months. He had sustained several broken bones and flesh cuts and there was some injury in the pelvic region. When released from the hospital he wallied with one crutch, but soon abandoned it and worked a few hours a day. At the time of the trial he could work half a day but suffered from pain where bones had been broken and in the region of the pelvis. The broken bones seem to have united properly. At that time he was earning $80 per month. Respondent appeared in court and testified.
As we have no question here relating to damages to respondent by reason of his physical injuries, testimony relating thereto is only important to us as bearing upon his probable life expectancy. Why respondent did not make his case clearer by testimony as to his age, his health, his family history or by the introduction of life tables, etc., we cannot inquire. The reason is not disclosed by either the direct or cross examination. The testimony presented was given to the jury under proper instructions and a verdict was had. The sum of damages is not of such an amount as would indicate in and of itself that it was arrived at through passion, prejudice or speculation.
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