Anderson v. Rindge Company
Before: Strother
[726]
STROTHER, J.,
pro
tem.
This action was brought by plaintiffs, a firm of lawyers, to recover an attorney’s fee alleged to be due for services rendered the defendant Rindge Company. The other defendant, Newby, also a lawyer, was so joined because he had an interest in the fee and refused to become a party plaintiff. The action was tried before a jury, which brought in a verdict for the amount of the demand.
The complaint is in two counts, one declaring upon a book account, the other upon a
quantum meruit
for the value of the services alleged to have been rendered at the instance of defendant. The answer of the Rindge Company is a specific denial of the allegations of the complaint. The answer of the defendant Newby admitted the allegations of the complaint. The defendant Rindge Company appeals from the judgment, and the record is brought before us in a bill of exceptions.
The evidence on behalf of plaintiffs gave a circumstantial account of the employment of the attorneys in certain litigation in which the Rindge Company was a party, and of the services rendered by them to that defendant.
The evidence on behalf of that defendant did not deny the fact of the employment or of the performance of any of the services claimed to have been rendered.
A number of exceptions were taken by defendants to the rulings of the court on admissions of evidence. Only three points, however, are urged in support of the appeal. The defendant offered in evidence a letter written by plaintiffs to Mrs. May K. Rindge, who seems to be the party principally interested in the Rindge Company, urging payment of fees for services in matters wholly unconnected with the claim in suit here, but reminding her of concessions made in other matters, in the hope of settlement. The letter contains this clause in relation to the matter in issue here: “and we also offered to leave the matter of the Broadway opening claim (reduced by us to $1,500.00 in the hope of a satisfactory adjustment) until you could confer with us in that matter.” To this offer plaintiffs objected and the court sustained the objection. The argument of appellant is that it was competent evidence as an admission against interest as to the value of the services. The statement in the letter was so patently a mere recital
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