California Court of Appeal Jun 28, 2016 No. E063760Unpublished
Filed 6/28/16 P. v. Wallace CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E063760
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1203213)
DECHAWN LEWIS WALLACE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Reversed.
Sarita Ordóñez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Warren J.
Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant Dechawn Lewis Wallace pleaded guilty to one count of receiving
stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) (all additional
statutory references are to the Penal Code), and was sentenced to eight months in state
prison to be served consecutively to a four-year sentence in another case. As part of his
the People may not withdraw from the plea bargain and reinstate dismissed charges.
Section 1170.18 unambiguously applies to a defendant “currently serving a
sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea . . . .” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a), italics
added; see T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646, 652 [concluding Prop. 47
“clearly and unambiguously” applies to convictions obtained by guilty plea].) The only
categorical disqualifications found in Proposition 47 are for defendants convicted of
serious or violent felonies, defendants required to register as sex offenders, and
defendants who are found to pose an unreasonable risk of committing a new violent
crime. (T.W. v. Superior Court, at p. 652.) “The statute does not otherwise automatically
10
disqualify a petitioner and nothing in section 1170.18 reflects an intent to disqualify a
petitioner because the conviction was obtained by plea agreement.” (Ibid.)
Relying on now-depublished authority, the People contend a stipulated prison term
is a fundamental assumption of a plea bargain that is binding on a defendant, and
misdemeanor sentencing under Proposition 47 would constitute a windfall to a defendant
not contemplated at the time of the plea. Moreover, relying on People v. Collins (1978)
21 Cal.3d 208 (Collins), the People contend they are entitled to withdraw from the plea
bargain and to reinstate dismissed charges because resentencing under Proposition 47
would have the effect of depriving the People of the benefit of their bargain. We disagree
with both bases of the People’s argument.
A negotiated plea bargain is a contract between a defendant and the prosecutor
and, if accepted, its terms bind the parties and the trial court. (People v. Segura (2008)
44 Cal.4th 921, 930-931.) Although the trial court retains inherent sentencing discretion,
it must impose a sentence within the bounds of the plea agreement. (Id. at p. 931.) If the
trial court disagrees with the terms of the plea agreement, it may reject it. (Id. at pp. 931-
932.) However, once the trial court has accepted a plea and imposed sentence, the
material terms of a plea bargain may not be modified without both parties’ consent.
(People v. Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75, 80.)
Although the parties and the trial court may not unilaterally alter the terms of a
plea bargain, subsequent statutory enactments or amendments adopted by the Legislature
or the voters exercising the initiative power may have the effect of altering the terms of
the plea bargain. “[T]he general rule in California is that the plea agreement will be
11
‘“deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power
of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in
pursuance of public policy. . . .”’ [Citation.] That the parties enter into a plea agreement
thus does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the
Legislature has intended to apply to them.” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66
(Doe).) “It therefore follows that ‘requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the
law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does
the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate
into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory
consequences attending his or her conviction.’” (Johnson v. Department of Justice
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 888-889, fn. 10, quoting Doe, at pp. 73-74.) “To that extent, then,
the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law.” (Doe, at p. 74.)
“[I]t is not impossible the parties to a particular plea bargain might affirmatively
agree or implicitly understand the consequences of a plea will remain fixed despite
amendments to the relevant law. [Citations.]” (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 71.)
“Whether such an understanding exists presents factual issues that generally require an
analysis of the representations made and other circumstances specific to the individual
case.” (Ibid.) Standing alone, however, “prosecutorial and judicial silence on the
possibility the Legislature might amend a statutory consequence of a conviction should
not ordinarily be interpreted to be an implied promise that the defendant will not be
subject to the amended law.” (Ibid.)
12
The People do not contend the plea bargain in this case included an express or
implied provision that defendant’s eight-month sentence would be insulated from future
legislative action, and we find no evidence to suggest otherwise. The mere fact defendant
agreed to serve eight months in exchange for the dismissal of additional charges is
insufficient evidence that he expressly or implicitly agreed his term of incarceration
would be insulated from legislative amendment.
Nor are we persuaded the People should be permitted on remand to withdraw from
the plea bargain and to reinstate dismissed counts because resentencing defendant would
deprive the People of the benefit of their bargain. The decision in Collins, supra,
21 Cal.3d 208, does not support the People’s request. The defendant there pleaded guilty
to one count of oral copulation in violation of former section 288a, in exchange for
dismissal of multiple charges and dismissal of the allegation the defendant committed the
oral copulation by means of force. (Collins, at p. 211.) Before sentencing, the
Legislature repealed former section 288a and enacted a new version of the statute that did
not proscribe oral copulation between consenting adults. (Collins, at p. 211.) The
defendant objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction to impose sentence because the crime
to which he pleaded guilty had been repealed. The trial court overruled the objection and
sentenced the defendant to one to 15 years in state prison. (Id. at pp. 211-212.)
The Supreme Court held the trial court erred by imposing a sentence because the
conduct for which the defendant was convicted was no longer punishable. (Collins,
supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 212-213.) With respect to a proper disposition, the defendant
stated he had no intention of withdrawing from the plea, which might trigger the People’s
13
right to reinstate the dismissed counts, and instead suggested the court “not reverse his
conviction but rather ‘correct’ the sentence to ‘no penalty’ . . . .” (Id. at p. 214.) Because
“[a] conviction cannot stand on appeal when it rests upon conduct that is no longer
sanctioned,” the court concluded the proper remedy was to reverse the conviction with
directions to dismiss the count on which the defendant was convicted. (Ibid.)
Next, the Supreme Court addressed whether the People could reinstate the
dismissed counts on remand. “Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal
benefits. When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which
it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.” (Collins, supra,
21 Cal.3d at p. 214.) “The state, in entering a plea bargain, generally contemplates a
certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the defendant’s vulnerability to a term of
punishment. . . . When a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence,
the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain.
Whether the defendant formally seeks to withdraw his guilty plea or not is immaterial; it
is his escape from vulnerability to sentence that fundamentally alters the character of the
bargain.” (Id. at p. 215, italics added.) The defendant in Collins sought relief from the
unlawful conviction “but [to] otherwise leave the plea bargain intact. This is bounty in
excess of that to which he is entitled.” (Id. at p. 215.) Because the legislative
amendment to former section 288a “destroy[ed] a fundamental assumption underlying the
plea bargain—that defendant would be vulnerable to a term of imprisonment”—the court
held, “[t]he state may therefore seek to reestablish defendant’s vulnerability by reviving
the counts dismissed.” (Ibid.)
14
Notwithstanding some broader language in Collins, the holding in that case is
narrow: the People may withdraw from a plea bargain and reinstate dismissed charges
only when a subsequent legislative change has the effect of eliminating entirely the
defendant’s conviction and vulnerability to incarceration and, consequently, has the effect
of entirely depriving the People of the benefit of their bargain. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d
at 215.)
If, on remand, the trial court grants defendant’s petition, at most Proposition 47
would have the effect of reducing defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor and
potentially reducing his term of incarceration. We say resentencing could potentially
result in a reduction in defendant’s punishment because, even after the passage of
Proposition 47, misdemeanor receipt of stolen property is punishable by incarceration in
county jail for no more than one year. (§ 496, subd. (a).) Theoretically, the trial court
could reclassify defendant’s conviction as a misdemeanor and sentence him to the same
eight-month term (cf. People v. Sellner (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 699, 701-702
[“[a]ppellant was not strictly ‘resentenced’ but, instead, ordered to serve the sentence
originally imposed, two years’ county jail”]), although the court may not resentence him
to a longer term. (§ 1170.18, subd. (e).) And even if the trial court were to sentence
defendant to a shorter term, defendant would not be completely insulated from
punishment, and the People would not be entirely deprived of their bargain. Collins is
simply inapplicable here.
Therefore, on remand, the People may not withdraw from the plea bargain and
may not reinstate dismissed counts.
15
III.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is reversed. On remand,
the trial court may exercise its discretion to determine whether defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a trial court cannot aggregate the value of property from dismissed counts to deny a Proposition 47 resentencing petition, and that the prosecution cannot withdraw from a plea bargain if a defendant is resentenced under the Act.
Issues
Whether a trial court may aggregate the value of property from dismissed counts to determine eligibility for Proposition 47 resentencing.
Whether the prosecution is entitled to withdraw from a plea bargain and reinstate dismissed charges if a defendant is resentenced under Proposition 47.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s sole reason for denying the petition was that, in light of defendant’s Harvey waiver, the total value of the property involved in this case exceeded $950. The People concede this was error, and we agree.”
“The trial court may not refuse to reduce a defendant’s sentence based on the court’s notion of the statute’s ‘spirit.’”
“We conclude the People may not withdraw from the plea bargain and reinstate dismissed charges if the superior court resentences defendant.”