California Court of Appeal Jun 27, 2016 No. D067545Unpublished
Filed 6/27/16 P. v. Chilcote CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D067545
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE340192)
RYAN CHILCOTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John M.
Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lise S. Jacobson and Randall D.
Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Ryan Chilcote guilty of one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant
(Pen. Code, § 273.5)1 with the further finding that he personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and one count of false imprisonment
(§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Chilcote to five years in prison.
Chilcote contends that insufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that he
The three-year enhancement in this case was imposed based on section 12022.7,
subdivision (e), which provides that "[a]ny person who personally inflicts great bodily
injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of a felony or
attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years." As used in section
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12022.7, subdivision (e), " 'great bodily injury' means a significant or substantial physical
injury." (§ 12022.7, subd. (f).)
Although a decision as to whether the victim suffered significant or substantial
physical injury is ultimately a question for the jury (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58,
64), case law discusses the circumstances under which the evidence sufficiently supports
a jury's finding of great bodily injury as defined in section 12022.7, subdivision (f). As
one recent case explained, "California case law reveals that some physical pain or
damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions is sufficient for a finding of 'great
bodily
injury.' " (People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047.) There is no
requirement "that the victim suffer 'permanent,' 'prolonged' or 'protracted' disfigurement,
impairment, or loss of bodily function." (Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 750.)
Thus, great bodily injury has been found based on evidence of "extensive bruises
and abrasions over the victim's legs, knees and elbows, injury to her neck and soreness in
her vaginal area of such severity that it significantly impaired her ability to walk"
(Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 750), and based on evidence that the victim had "multiple
contusions over various portions of her body," swelling, severe discoloration, and still felt
pain and had visible injuries the next day (People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830,
836). Many other authorities reach similar conclusions, finding evidence of abrasions,
lacerations and bruises sufficient to constitute great bodily injury. (See, e.g., People v.
Bustos (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1747, 1755 ["multiple abrasions, lacerations, and
contusions suffered by the victim" from a hit to the face and struggle on the floor
6
constituted great bodily injury as defined in § 12022.7]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131
Cal.App.3d 718, 733 [the victim suffered multiple abrasions and lacerations on her back
and neck and had serious swelling and bruising of her right eye and a markedly swollen
left cheek]; People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1489 [great bodily injury
inflicted when victim was strangled until she nearly passed out leaving a purple line on
her neck, her eyes swelled and her nose bled, she suffered a blow to her head that
produced a bump, and her eyes were red and her face was bruised].)
Here, Schaffner's injuries were consistent with the type of injuries described in the
case law as constituting great bodily injury. Specifically, Schaffner suffered lacerations
on her face, collarbone and under her ear, had a severely swollen face and eye, had
bruising on her neck, and had abrasions on her legs from being dragged on the ground.
Further, those injuries persisted until at least the next day and she continued to be in pain.
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that
Chilcote personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Chilcote acknowledges the case law cited above and concedes that "courts have
continuously held lacerations, bruises or abrasions to be sufficient evidence of great
bodily injury." However, Chilcote contends that those cases were wrongly decided and
"need to be revisited." Specifically, Chilcote argues that a finding of great bodily injury
under section 12022.7 should require "proof of an injury that is even more severe than
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that required to establish 'serious bodily injury' under section 243, subdivisions (d) and
(f)(4)," which applies to battery convictions.3
Chilcote relies on People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999 for his argument that a
finding of great bodily injury requires proof of an injury that is more severe than serious
bodily injury as described in section 243. However, Santana does not lend support. In
Santana, the issue was whether the jury instruction for mayhem (§ 203) properly stated
that "serious bodily injury" was a required element. (Santana, at p. 1007.) In the course
of its analysis, Santana explained that the reference to "serious bodily injury" in the
instruction came from case law holding that " 'great bodily injury is an element of
mayhem.' " (Id. at p. 1008.) Santana observed that although "the terms 'serious bodily
injury' and 'great bodily injury' have been described as ' " 'essential[ly]
equivalent' " ' . . . and as having 'substantially the same meaning,' " the two terms "in fact
'have separate and distinct statutory definitions' " which "may make a difference when
evaluating jury instructions that provide different definitions for the two terms." (Id. at
pp. 1008-1009.) Based on this observation, Santana concluded that in reviewing the jury
instruction, it could not "conclude that the offense of mayhem includes a serious bodily
3 Under section 243, subdivision (d), when a battery produces "serious bodily injury," the battery is punishable by a jail term or a prison term of two, three or four years (§ 243, subd. (d)). Section 243 defines the term "serious bodily injury" as "a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of any function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement." (§ 243, subd, (f)(4).) 8
injury requirement simply based on cases holding that mayhem includes a great bodily
injury component." (Id. at p. 1009, italics added.)
Santana does not, as Chilcote contends, state that "serious bodily injury" as used
in section 243 is intended to be a less demanding standard than the term "great bodily
injury" as used in section 12022.7. Instead, Santana simply observes that the two terms
are different, with distinct statutory origins, so that when precise terminology matters in
the drafting of jury instructions the two terms and their statutory definitions should not be
used interchangeably. Moreover, Santana says nothing that calls into question the long
line of case authority we cited above establishing that bruises, abrasions and lacerations
may properly form the basis for a jury's finding that the defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury on a victim under section 12022.7.
Chilcote also argues that the Legislature must have viewed great bodily injury
described in section 12022.7, subdivision (f) as a more severe type of injury than serious
bodily injury in section 243 because it provided a more severe punishment for causing
serious bodily injury in the course of a battery under section 243, subdivision (d).
Specifically, Chilcote points out that the punishment for battery causing serious bodily
injury is either a jail term not to exceed one year, or a prison term of two, three or four
years (§ 243, subd. (d)), whereas the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) is three years in prison.4
4 Here, as we have explained, Chilcote was found to have inflicted great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (e), which applies to domestic violence circumstances, and which carries an enhancement of three, four or five years. However, 9
As an initial matter, we cannot agree with Chilcote's predicate that a true finding
on the great bodily injury enhancement necessarily carries a greater penal sanction than
for the crime of battery causing serious bodily injury. A true finding on the great bodily
injury enhancement carries a maximum additional term of three years (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a)); a battery causing serious bodily injury carries a maximum additional term of three
and one-half years more than a battery without serious bodily injury (compare § 243,
subd. (a) [battery alone is six months] with § 243, subd. (d) [battery with serious bodily
injury carries term of up to four years].)
Moreover, even assuming the legislative scheme does contemplate harsher penal
consequences for a great bodily injury enhancement in some cases than a conviction for
battery causing serious bodily injury, the two statutory schemes differ in important ways
that make different punishments appropriate, regardless of the severity of the injuries
they describe. Specifically, the punishment for causing serious bodily injury in section
243, subdivision (d) only arises in the context of a battery conviction, which is already a
forceful violent crime (§ 242), whereas the punishment for inflicting great bodily injury
applies to all types of felonies, regardless of whether they are necessarily forceful violent
crimes. Moreover, a defendant is only assessed the additional punishment for inflicting
great bodily injury in the course of a felony if he or she personally inflicts the great
bodily injury. In contrast, the punishment for serious bodily injury in section 243,
as Chilcote correctly points out, the generally applicable enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) carries an enhancement of three years. Chilcote premises his argument on the fact that section 12077, subdivision (f) provides the same definition of great bodily injury for both section 12077, subdivision (a) and section 12022.7, subdivision (e). 10
subdivision (d) does not include a requirement that the defendant personally inflict the
injury. (Cf. People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403 [defendant pleaded guilty to
assault with a deadly weapon and battery with serious bodily injury as an aider and
abettor of the direct attacker].) Because of these differences, the disparate indicated
punishments in the two statutes would not establish that the Legislature viewed great
bodily injury in section 12022.7, subdivision (a) as a more severe type of injury than
serious bodily injury in section 243, subdivision (d).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
PRAGER, J.*
* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 11
AI Brief
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Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury, as the victim's injuries—including facial lacerations, swelling, and bruising—met the statutory definition of significant or substantial physical injury.
Issues
Whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (e).
Whether the definition of 'great bodily injury' under section 12022.7 requires a higher threshold of severity than 'serious bodily injury' under section 243.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Schaffner's injuries were consistent with the type of injuries described in the case law as constituting great bodily injury.”
“California case law reveals that some physical pain or damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions is sufficient for a finding of 'great bodily injury.'”
“substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chilcote personally inflicted great bodily injury.”