Khodayari v. Ardalan CA2/4

Filed 6/22/16 Khodayari v. Ardalan CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

BAHMAN KHODAYARI, B262916

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC090227) v.

PEZHMAN CHRISTOPHER ARDALAN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Frank Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. Bahman Khodayari, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Mark K. Drew and Mark K. Drew for Defendants and Respondents.

Some three years ago we decided an appeal between the same parties, over the same dispute. (Khodayari v. Ardalan (April 10, 2013, B239102) [nonpub. opn.]; “previous opinion.”) In that case, appellant sought to reverse court orders granting dismissal of most of the causes of action after a successful demurrer and summary judgment for respondents on the others. In our unpublished opinion from that appeal, we affirmed the order of dismissal but reversed the order granting summary judgment. Those rulings and their supporting rationale are, of course, law of the case as to this subsequent appeal. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246; Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed., 2008), Appeal, § 459.) In further proceedings on remand, the trial court ultimately granted respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and it is from that judgment that the present appeal is presented.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY The underlying facts and procedural history are fully discussed in our previous opinion, and we briefly recount them now. Appellant, Bahman Khodayri, and his brother operated an auto repair business. In 2006 appellant was charged with 26 misdemeanor counts of grand theft, attempted extortion, and other related crimes. He sought legal representation and ultimately retained respondents. The previous appeal and this appeal center on the terms of that engagement. Appellant claimed that respondent agreed to represent him in the criminal proceedings, through trial by court or jury, for a flat fee of $15,000, to be paid in advance, excluding costs of investigation and appeal. According to appellant, that was the oral agreement of the parties. The written retainer agreement was quite different. It provided that respondents would represent appellant in the criminal proceedings for a fee of $300 an hour for counsel and $100 an hour for paralegals and law clerks, plus various costs, and that appellant would provide an advance of $15,000 for the first 50 hours of work. According to appellant, when the agreement was signed, respondents told him that it reflected the terms agreed to in the oral understanding, and appellant simply signed the written instrument at the places indicated by respondents. Significantly, appellant is a