California Court of Appeal Jun 15, 2016 No. E061907Unpublished
Filed 6/15/16 P. v. Garcia CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E061907
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. SWF1200099 & SWF1302718) CARLOS MARIO GARCIA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dennis A. McConaghy,
Judge. (Retired Judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions.
Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Heather M.
Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Carlos Mario Garcia appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his request for relief from civil assessments imposed in case Nos. SWF1200099
and SWF1302718. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for relief because it was not aware it had discretion to strike the assessments.
Here, the clerk’s certification notes that warning letters were sent to defendant on
November 19 and 20, 2013, informing him that a failure to pay or failure to appear would
result in the imposition of a civil assessment fee. However, without the actual letters, it is
not possible to determine whether the letters were prospective warnings or whether they
were letters informing defendant that he was already in violation and that he had a certain
time within which to comply. Without the letters, it is not possible to determine whether
defendant appeared “within the time specified in the notice[s]” (§ 1214.1, subd. (b)) or
whether the assessment was appropriate or whether defendant complied with his
obligations to pay his fines to avoid the assessments.
An appellate record is constitutionally inadequate “only if the complained-of
deficiency is prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to prosecute his appeal.” (People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8; see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132,
1164-1166 (Howard) [record satisfies federal due process if it permits adequate, effective
appellate review]; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170 [“[a] criminal
defendant is entitled under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments [to the federal
Constitution] to an appellate record that is adequate to permit meaningful review”].) The
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that omissions in the appellate record render it
4 In 2015, subdivision (b) of section 1214.1 designated paragraph (1), inserted “imposed pursuant to subdivision (a),” substituted “20” for “10,” and added a paragraph 2. (Stats. 2015, ch. 385, § 1.)
9
inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. (Howard, supra, at pp. 1164-1166.)
“No presumption of prejudice arises from the absence of materials from the appellate
record . . . .” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 820.)
In the present matter, despite defendant’s efforts to augment the court records
concerning the civil assessments, it appears the appellate record still remains inadequate
to permit meaningful appellate review. The record does not contain appropriate
documentation to support a conclusion that defendant complied with the warning notice
or that defendant appeared “within the time specified in the notice” as required under
section 1214.1. However, defense counsel asserted, and neither the People nor the trial
court objected, that defendant appeared within the appropriate time frame.
In addition, under the circumstances of this case, it appears the court was not fully
aware it had the discretion to strike the civil assessments, despite the court’s assertion
that it had “read the law.” Initially, we note the court referenced two case numbers that
are not contained in this record. Second, the court made conflicting statements relating to
the civil assessments. The court first stated it could not “do anything with the civil
assessment,” but then inquired, “The civil assessment was for the unpaid legal fees,
right?” After defense counsel replied in the affirmative, the court stated “I’ll waive the
legal fees on that one.” Nonetheless, when defense counsel mentioned defendant began
working in San Diego, the court stated, “Well, you know what, the thing that has been
sent to the Franchise Tax Board I can’t do anything with, and it’s already gone to civil
assessment. I can’t do anything with that either. So it doesn’t make a whole lot of
10
difference. If he’s employed, I’m not going to waive any of the fees.” The court later
stated, “I don’t think the AIDS education program is required. The other fees, since he’s
working, I’m not going to waive. And the civil assessment I can’t do anything with, so
I’m not going to doing anything with it.”
When defense counsel purported to explain section 1214.1, the court interrupted
counsel and stated, “I’ve read the law. I know what the law says.” The court did not cite
to this law and again noted “I’m not going to do it because he has a job. And there’s a
chance he’s going to get it paid within a year.” However, the court’s comments are
unclear as to whether the court was referring to the “other fees” or the civil assessments.
Based on an entire reading of the court’s comments and the fact the court had previously
mentioned it was not going to waive the “other fees” because defendant was working, it
appears the court was referring to the law concerning “other fees.” When defense
counsel again attempted to explain the request was in regards to the civil assessment, the
court repeated, “I cannot do anything—listen to me. The law won’t let me do anything
with the civil assessment, and I shall not do it” and told counsel to “take a writ.”
The People argue that “it seems” defendant “appeared outside of the 10 days
provided by statute at which time the assessments were already ‘effective’ ” and that the
court’s comments indicate it knew it had discretion to vacate the civil assessments, “but
only if [defendant] complied with the timing requirements of the statute.” However,
neither the court nor the People mentioned the timing requirement under section 1214.1.
Moreover, as previously noted, neither the People nor the court took issue with defense
11
counsel’s claim that defendant complied with the statutory requirements of
section1214.1. In fact, defense counsel specifically stated, “Your Honor, I just want to
make sure that the record is clear that pursuant to that, we’re asking for the civil
assessment to be vacated. He did make payments on those. He did come in within the
specified time, and based on that, we’re asking for the civil assessments to be vacated.”
Based on a thorough analysis of the record, it appears the trial court misunderstood
its discretion when ruling on defendant’s request to vacate the civil assessments in case
Nos. SWF1200099 and SWF1302718. Although the record reflects the court’s attempt to
apply its discretion regarding the “other fees,” we cannot harmonize the court’s
comments as to why it could not exercise such discretion as to the civil assessments. The
trial court here incorrectly believed that it did not have the authority to vacate the civil
assessments. “It is a paradigmatic abuse of discretion for a court to base its judgment on
an erroneous view of the law.” (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 333 (conc. opn. of
O’Connor, J.).)
The People further claim that defendant failed to establish the requisite good cause
for vacating any assessment. However, it appears the trial court did not deny defendant’s
request because defendant failed to show good cause to vacate the civil assessments.
Instead, the court denied the request because it could not “do anything with the civil
assessment,” believing it had no authority. Moreover, because the trial court refused to
hear defendant’s explanation, defendant was not permitted to demonstrate good cause for
12
his nonpayment of the fines. The record indicates that the court misunderstood its
discretionary choice.
An erroneous understanding by the trial court of its discretionary power is not a
true exercise of discretion. (People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282.)
“Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed
discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.]” (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d
335, 348, fn. 8.) A court cannot exercise that “ ‘informed discretion’ ” where it is
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers. (Ibid.) Although a trial court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law, when the record
demonstrates that “the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption
it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity
to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing.” (People v. Brown
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228-1229.)
On this record, we cannot find the court knowingly exercised its discretion as
directed by section 1214.1. By misunderstanding and failing to properly exercise the
scope of its discretion to vacate the civil assessments, the court prejudicially abused its
discretion. We therefore remand the matter for the court to exercise its discretionary
choices.
13
III
DISPOSITION
Case Nos. SWF1200099 and SWF1302718 are remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the views expressed herein. In all other respects, the judgments are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
McKINSTER J.
14
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court abused its discretion by erroneously concluding it lacked the legal authority to vacate civil assessments under Penal Code section 1214.1, necessitating a remand for the court to exercise its informed discretion.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying a request to vacate civil assessments based on a misunderstanding of its discretionary authority under Penal Code section 1214.1.
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court here incorrectly believed that it did not have the authority to vacate the civil assessments.”
“An erroneous understanding by the trial court of its discretionary power is not a true exercise of discretion.”
“We therefore remand the matter for the court to exercise its discretionary choices.”