Haddad v. Willis CA1/3

Filed 6/3/16 Haddad v. Willis CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

KHOSROW HADDAD, Plaintiff and Respondent, A145369 v. LILLIYA G. WILLIS, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC1401218) Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Lilliya G. Willis (Willis), in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion to set aside a default and default judgment entered in favor of respondent Khosrow Haddad (Haddad) and against Willis. She contends the default and default judgment were the result of excusable neglect or mistake, or were procured by fraud. We reject the contention and affirm the order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 25, 2014, Haddad filed a complaint against Willis alleging breach of contract, quiet title, accounting, unjust enrichment, partition, declaratory relief, imposition of constructive trust, and ouster. He filed a notice of lis pendens the same day. He alleged in his complaint that he and Willis were joint owners of a single family home (the Property) located in Antioch, California. On or about December 11, 2011, they agreed to live in the Property together. Haddad would pay for two-thirds of the costs and expenses related to the Property—including the down payment, mortgage, taxes, insurance, and improvements—and would own two-thirds of the Property. Willis would pay for one-third of the costs and expenses related to the Property, and would own

1

one-third of the Property. If one party contributed more than his or her share, that party would receive a corresponding additional interest in the Property. Based on the agreement, Haddad executed a grant deed transferring two-thirds of the interest in the Property to his personal trust and one-third of the interest to Willis. Haddad paid $140,000 towards the down payment and Willis paid $30,013 towards the down payment. They agreed Willis would reimburse Haddad for the additional $46,666 she was required to pay towards the down payment so that she would retain her one-third interest in the Property. Willis never reimbursed him the $40,666, and thereafter failed to pay for one-third of the monthly mortgage. Haddad also contributed over $225,000 in improvements to the Property, but Willis did not reimburse him one-third of that cost. On May 15, 2014, Willis excluded Haddad from the Property and took sole and exclusive possession of it. She refused to allow him to enter, yet expected him to continue paying the costs and expenses related to the Property, including the mortgage, which was in his name only. In his complaint, Haddad sought, among other things, an accounting of all property acquired by the parties, division of property, transfer of title or compensatory damages in the alternative, a partition by sale, a judicial determination as to his right, title and interest to the Property, and an order declaring that Willis was holding the Property in trust for Haddad. The summons and complaint and other related documents were served on Willis by a registered California process server on July 12, 2014. On August 12, 2014, Haddad filed a request for entry of default, which he served on Willis by mail the same day. The trial court granted the request. Thereafter, on October 30, 2014, Haddad filed a request for a default judgment seeking declaratory relief “or decree, that [Willis] has no right, title, or interest, in the real property” and that her “alleged Deed to the Property is null, void, and of no effect.” Haddad also sought “a Judgment of Ejectment to remove Willis from the Property which she wrongfully possesses and [from which she] has ousted [Haddad].” Haddad submitted a declaration setting forth detailed information regarding the purchase, the loan, and the parties’ agreement. He attached to his declaration a copy of the grant deed, loan