California Court of Appeal May 19, 2016 No. D069426Unpublished
Filed 5/19/16 P. v. Montenegro CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D069426
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1101427)
CARMEN MONTELONGO MONTENEGRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed.
Randall B. Bookout, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland,
Assistant Attorneys General, Barry Jay Carlton and James Henry Flaherty III, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Carmen Montelongo Montenegro of first degree murder. (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) It found true an allegation that she personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The court
sentenced her to 25 years to life on the murder conviction, and one consecutive year on
the enhancement.
Montenegro contends the court erroneously (1) denied her motion for acquittal
Even if the evidence regarding some of the Anderson factors is weak, we note that
"[i]n reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, each case of necessity must turn on its
14
own particular facts." (People v. Smith, (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 745.) Further,
"[e]vidence of all three elements is not essential . . . to sustain a conviction." (People v.
Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813.) Rather, "[t]hese three categories are merely a
framework for appellate review; they need not be present in some special combination or
afforded special weight, nor are they exhaustive." (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th
141, 173.)
C. Analysis
The People presented evidence regarding Montenegro's financial motive for
killing Wiggins. Michele testified that Wiggins and Montenegro were arguing about
whether Montenegro would accompany him to Texas because Montenegro wanted him to
give her $500 for her daughter, and she wanted the use of his car, both requests that
Wiggins rejected. One of Wiggins's neighbors also testified Montenegro had asked
Wiggins for money. Further, after the presumed date of Wiggins's death, Montenegro
had Wiggins's bank cards in her possession and used them to withdraw money from
Wiggins's bank account and pay for items. Montenegro also was seen driving Wiggins's
vehicle, which the neighbors testified had never happened before. The jury could
reasonably conclude that Montenegro murdered Wiggins in order to be able to have
access to his funds and his car.
Montenegro disputes that she had a financial motive for killing Wiggins, arguing
that Wiggins was "far more of an asset to [her] alive than dead." But even if Montenegro
regards the financial motive as unreasonable, as stated in People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168
Cal.App.3d 97, 102, "the law does not require that a first degree murderer have a
15
'rational' motive for killing." (See also People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529
[motive not clear].) The California Supreme Court has stated that the fact of an
unreasonable motivation "is true of any senseless killing, but the incomprehensibility of
the motive does not mean that the jury could not reasonably infer that the defendant
entertained and acted on it." (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1238.) Here,
the evidence presented in the People's case-in-chief was sufficient to support the financial
motive, and that motive was rational given that before Wiggins's death, he was reluctant
to give Montenegro money or permit her the use of his car. After he died, she ended up
using his money and his car.
We further conclude substantial evidence shows Montenegro had the opportunity
to murder Wiggins. Montenegro was in a romantic relationship with him and had shared
his residence. The police found that a knife, possibly the murder weapon, had been
removed from the kitchen. The murder likely occurred in the part of the house where
Wiggins's blood splatter was found, and where the carpet was removed. Given that
Wiggins was an older man who, by Baltes's account, was smaller than Montenegro, and
when last seen by a neighbor he looked worn down and was moving slowly, it is
reasonable to infer Montenegro was able to overpower him and killed him.
Montenegro also claims the prosecution in its case-in-chief did not present
sufficient evidence that she acted with the intent necessary for first degree murder. But
the evidence suggests Montenegro had to get the knife from the kitchen and take it to a
separate room. The number of stab wounds and their placement on Wiggins's body also
support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. He was stabbed 24 times to the
16
upper body, including two to the chest, perforating his lungs. In light of the fact police
searched Wiggins's residence and found no signs of struggle, a reasonable conclusion is
that Montenegro deliberated and premeditated to inflict those stab wounds to the
vulnerable areas of Wiggins's body to kill Wiggins when he was unable to defend
himself. We conclude the above evidence sufficed to show that Montenegro acted with
the intent necessary to commit first degree murder.
The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in People v. Raley
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, where the defendant stabbed the victims numerous times, then
drove them around, beat them, and dumped their bodies in a ravine, after which one
victim died. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of
premeditation and deliberation, explaining, "Even if we were to agree that it could only
be concluded that the many stab wounds defendant inflicted on each woman were part of
an unreflective explosion of violence, his calculated decision to let them bleed for the
next 18 hours, to refuse medical attention, to beat them about the head and to dump them
on a winter night into an isolated ravine supports the conclusion that he premeditated the
death of [the murder victim]." (Id. at p. 888.) Here, the jury could reasonably conclude
that after stabbing Wiggins 24 times, Montenegro left him to bleed and die, rather than
get him medical attention. That calculated decision supports a finding of premeditation.
In People v. Daya (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 697, the court stated: "[I]n this case the
deficiency is not in the evidence of culpability but rather the deficiency of any plausible
explanation for the abundance of evidence pointing to the defendant's postmurder
consciousness of guilt." Likewise, here, there was overwhelming evidence of
17
Montenegro's consciousness of guilt: she lied to Wiggins's family members and
neighbors who sought to contact him; she lied to police, giving them the impression
Wiggins was still alive, that he was on drugs and would eventually call them back. All
indications—given Wiggins's decomposed body—are that Wiggins at that time was
already dead. Montenegro also took extraordinary measures to conceal Wiggins's
dismembered body parts, separating them and burying some in potted plants, and others
in a back yard. She also removed evidence from the crime scene, asking a friend to keep
pieces of the carpet that was stained in blood. She asked another friend for a place she
could buy telephones that could not be traced.
The substantial amount of consciousness of guilt evidence could reasonably lead a
jury to conclude Montenegro had murdered Wiggins; therefore, she was attempting to
cover up her involvement in his first degree murder by lying about it and removing
evidence from the crime scene. The evidence here tends to negate any inference that she
committed the murder in self-defense or based on a provocation because if either
circumstance had obtained, she could have called the police and explained what
happened, and she would have had no need to lie to police and Wiggins's loved ones.
Montenegro argues that the evidence shows she was just one of several other
people involved in hiding the evidence after Wiggins's murder. But under our standard of
review, " 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trier of fact's] findings,' the
judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a
contrary finding." (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468-469.) In summary,
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a
18
reasonable doubt that Montenegro had the requisite specific intent to murder Wiggins
with premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272.)
Because the evidence is sufficient to support Montenegro's conviction of first degree
murder of Wiggins, the trial court did not err by denying Montenegro's motion for
judgment of acquittal. (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.)
II.
The Court Had No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct the Jury on Voluntary
Manslaughter
Montenegro acknowledges testifying that Wiggins raped her, but she did not kill
him. Nevertheless, on appeal, she contends that the court committed prejudicial error by
not instructing the jury sua sponte regarding heat of passion manslaughter. She claims
that a properly instructed jury could have concluded that, contrary to her testimony, she
killed Wiggins because he had raped her.
A. Background
In discussing whether to instruct the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter, the
court told counsel: "The defense is that Ms. Montenegro didn't kill Mr. Wiggins and I
don't see that there's any evidence to support [voluntary] manslaughter instruction."
Defense counsel agreed: "[O]bviously my client testified and she testified that she did
not commit this offense. There hasn't been any evidence deduced that would support
giving that instruction." The prosecutor also agreed that no such instruction should be
given.
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B. Applicable Law
Statutory voluntary manslaughter has been defined as an unlawful killing "upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion" (§ 192, subd. (a), italics added) and the malice
required for murder has been implied "when no considerable provocation appears"
(§ 188). As a result, both subjectively felt heat of passion and objectively reasonable
provocation are needed to negate malice and reduce a murder to manslaughter (People v.
Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1143), whether the heat of passion is generated by a
sudden quarrel or a series of provocative acts over a long period of time. Thus, to
warrant instructions on provocation and heat of passion, there must be substantial
evidence in the trial record to support a finding that, at the time of the killing, defendant's
reason was (1) actually obscured as a result of a strong passion; (2) the passion was
provoked by the victim's conduct; and (3) the provocation was sufficient to cause an
ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection, and from this passion rather than from due deliberation or reflection. (People
v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201; People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108;
People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 951.)
The duty to instruct exists even when the lesser included offense is inconsistent
with the defendant's own theory of the case and the defendant objects to the instruction.
(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 157.) "Generally, when a defendant
completely denies complicity in the charged crime, there is no error in failing to instruct
on a lesser included offense." (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 709.)
20
"[T]he failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital
case is, at most, an error of California law alone, and is thus subject only to state
standards of reversibility." (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165.) A
conviction of the charged offense may be reversed as a result of such an error only if,
" 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence' (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13), it appears 'reasonably probable' the defendant would have obtained a more
favorable outcome had the error not occurred." (Id. at p. 178; People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
"Such posttrial review focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what
such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration."
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) "In making that evaluation, an appellate court
may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing
judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so
comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the
defendant complains affected the result." (Ibid; see People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th
596, 621 [failure to instruct regarding lesser included offense, when evidence in support
of that offense "was, at best, extremely weak" did not constitute reversible error].)
C. Analysis
Montenegro provided the only testimony regarding Wiggins's purported rape of
her. She elaborated that after the rape, she fled Wiggins's residence. She elected not to
call the police, go to the hospital or tell her family about what had happened. Rather, she
went to her residence, where she showered, spoke to LaFevre about the rape, and went to
21
sleep, wanting to forget about the incident. According to Montenegro, she did not see
LaFevre until a few days later, when he took her to Wiggins's residence and she learned
that LaFevre—a frail man in his mid-80's—had killed Wiggins. Separately, police also
did not find evidence of a struggle at Wiggins's residence. Because the record is devoid
of any suggestion Montenegro killed Wiggins in a heat of passion while she was affected
by any provocation regarding Wiggins's purported rape of her, there was insufficient
evidence to warrant the court giving a voluntary manslaughter instruction.4
III.
Montenegro concedes she did not object to the court's instruction of the jury with
CALCRIM No. 3595 regarding corpus delicti but nonetheless contends her appellate
claim is not forfeited because it implicates her substantial rights. She contends the
instruction allowed the jury to infer she killed Wiggins based on her out of court
statements alone, thus violating her constitutional rights to due process and to a jury
4 We point out that at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved for a continuance to file a new trial motion, arguing she intended to raise a claim of insufficiency of evidence to sustain the first degree murder conviction, contending the jury could have believed Wiggins raped her. The court stated: "My suspicion is the jury didn't believe that."
5 The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 359: "The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on her out-of-court statements alone. You may only rely on the defendant's out-of-court statements to convict her if you conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime was committed. [¶] That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed. [¶] The identity of the person who committed the crime may be proved by the defendant's statements alone. [¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
22
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Montenegro relies on People v. Rivas
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427 (Rivas), which concluded the version of CALCRIM
No. 359 given here was " 'confusing and internally contradictory and gives a false
impression of the law.' " Assuming the issue is reviewable, we reject it on the merits.
A. Applicable Law
"In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body
of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal
agency as its cause." (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169 (Alvarez).)
The prosecution must establish the corpus delicti independent from the admissions of the
defendant, thus assuring the accused does not admit to a crime which did not occur. (Id.
at p. 1169.) "The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a
reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a
noncriminal explanation is also plausible. [Citations.] There is no requirement of
independent evidence 'of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,' so
long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal
agency." (Id. at p. 1171.)
"The amount of independent proof of a crime required for this purpose is quite
small; we have described this quantum of evidence as 'slight' [citation] or 'minimal'
[citation]. The People need make only a prima facie showing ' "permitting the reasonable
inference that a crime was committed." ' [Citations.] The inference need not be 'the only,
or even the most compelling, one . . . [but need only be] a reasonable one.' " (People v.
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301-302.) "In every case, once the necessary quantum of
23
independent evidence is present, the defendant's extrajudicial statements may then be
considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues." (Alvarez, supra, 27
Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
The identity of the defendant as the perpetrator is not part of the corpus delicti;
identity may be established by the defendant's words alone. (People v. Frye (1998) 18
Cal.4th 894, 960, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 421, fn. 22.)
"Whenever an accused's extrajudicial statements form part of the prosecution's
evidence, the cases have additionally required the trial court to instruct sua sponte that a
finding of guilt cannot be predicated on the statements alone." (Alvarez, supra, 27
Cal.4th at p. 1170; People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1137.) The corpus delicti
rule is defined in CALCRIM No. 359 and its predecessor, CALJIC No. 2.72. (People v.
Rosales (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1258-1259.)
As explained above, Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 1410 held the first two
paragraphs of CALCRIM No. 359 correctly state the corpus delicti rule. However, Rivas
held the pattern instruction was confusing because of the third paragraph about the
declarant's identity: "[T]he reference to identity in CALCRIM No. 359 presents a risk of
confounding the jury by telling jurors that a defendant's inculpatory extrajudicial
statements, taken alone, do not suffice to allow the jury to convict the defendant of a
charged crime—and yet those statements, again taken alone, are entertainable to prove
the defendant's 'identity [as] the person who committed the crime' (CALJIC No. 359, 3d
24
par.), which to any juror can only mean the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, i.e., the
guilty party. The instruction requires reconsideration." (Id. at p. 1429.)
Rivas acknowledged that in People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 (Foster), the
California Supreme Court upheld CALJIC No. 2.72, the predecessor corpus delicti
instruction. Rivas distinguished Foster because "[t]he wording of CALJIC No. 2.72 is
quite different" and the predecessor instruction properly explained that identity was not
an element of the crime, whereas CALCRIM No. 359 failed to do so. (Rivas, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430.)6
We disagree with Rivas and believe the better view is expressed in People v.
Rosales, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 1254, which reviewed the purpose of the corpus delicti
rule, disagreed with Rivas, and held the third paragraph of CALCRIM No. 359 was not
confusing: "It is . . . well established that a defendant's inculpatory out-of-court
statements may . . . be relied upon to establish his or her identity as the perpetrator of a
crime. [Citations.] This is because the perpetrator's identity is not part of the corpus
delicti. [Citations.] [¶] CALCRIM No. 359, like CALJIC No. 2.72, clearly so states.
6 After the Rivas decision, the Judicial Counsel revised CALCRIM No. 359, which now states: "The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on (his/her) out-of- court statement[s] alone. You may rely on the defendant's out-of-court statements to convict (him/her) only if you first conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed. [¶] That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed. [¶] This requirement of other evidence does not apply to proving the identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the crime]. If other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed, the identity of the person who committed it [and the degree of the crime] may be proved by the defendant's statement[s] alone. [¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved (his/her) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 25
The corpus delicti rule is stated in the first two paragraphs of CALCRIM No. 359. The
law concerning proof of identity by a defendant's extrajudicial statements is correctly
stated in the third paragraph. There is no danger a jury will be unable to separate the two
rules any more than in CALJIC No. 2[.]72 which has been approved by our Supreme
Court . . . . As noted, CALJIC No. 2.72 states in part: 'The identity of the person who is
alleged to have committed a crime is not an element of the crime [nor is the degree of the
crime]. The identity [or degree of the crime] may be established by [a] [an] [confession]
[or] [admission].' CALCRIM No. 359 states with greater precision and economy of
language, 'The identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the
crime] may be proved by the defendant's statement[s] alone.' CALCRIM No. 359
correctly states the law. [Citations.] There was no reasonable likelihood the jury was
confused and misapplied the instruction. Finally, CALCRIM No. 359 reminds the jury
that the accused may not be convicted unless the prosecution proves guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. CALJIC No. 2.72, which was approved by our Supreme Court in
Foster, [supra, 50 Cal.4th 1301,] contains no such reminder." (Rosales, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1260-1261; see also People v. Reyes (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491,
1498.)
We agree with Rosales's analysis of the corpus delicti rule and CALCRIM No.
379, and similarly conclude the instruction was not confusing and did not mislead the
jury.
IV.
26
The Court Did Not Err by Instructing the Jury With CALCRIM No. 362
Montenegro contends the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No.
362 regarding consciousness of guilt, an instruction that she maintains was not supported
by substantial evidence because she made no pretrial statements relating to Wiggins
murder; rather, her statements related to disposing of Wiggins's body. Montenegro
contends the jury instruction was argumentative because it "invited the jury to assume the
prosecution's version of the facts: namely, that the false and misleading statements
appellant made during the course of her attempts to dispose of the victim's body parts
meant she was the one who killed him." She also contends the instruction was confusing
and misleading because unlike CALJIC No. 2.03, the predecessor instruction, it did not
specify it applied to her statements made "before this trial."
A. Background
Over Montenegro's objection, the court instructed the jury with the following
modified version of CALCRIM No. 362: "If the defendant made a false or misleading
statement relating to the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to
mislead, that conduct may show she was aware of her guilt of the crime and you may
consider it in determining her guilt. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant made the
statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that
the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself."7
7 The Judicial Council version of CALCRIM No. 362 reads: "If [the] defendant [<insert name of defendant when multiple defendants on trial>] made a false or misleading statement before this trial relating to the charged crime, knowing the 27
B. Applicable Law
In People v. Beyah (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1241, the court concluded: "[W]e
doubt that the CALCRIM Committee intended CALCRIM No. 362 to be used as it was
here: to permit an inference of consciousness of guilt based on knowingly false or
intentionally misleading statements in a defendant's trial testimony. Nevertheless, we
conclude that defendant suffered no prejudice, because California law makes clear that a
defendant's false trial testimony may, in proper circumstances, be considered as evidence
of consciousness of guilt." (Beyah, at pp. 1248-1249.)
C. Analysis
We reject Montenegro's preemptive conclusion that CALCRIM No. 362 was
inapplicable because "[n]one of [her] pre-trial statements . . . pertained to the killing of
Samuel Wiggins." The language of CALCRIM No. 362 broadly refers to a defendant's
statement "relating to the charged crime." By its own terms, the instruction permitted the
jury to reasonably conclude that Montenegro's statements to Bell and his group to help
her get rid of Wiggins's body parts related to Montenegro's involvement in killing
Wiggins. Montenegro's contrary conclusion is based on a cramped interpretation of the
instruction. Further, to the extent the instruction left it to the jury to "decide" the
"meaning and importance" of Montenegro's statements, it was not argumentative because
statement was false or intending to mislead, that conduct may show (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt of the crime and you may consider it in determining (his/her) guilt. [You may not consider the statement in deciding any other defendant's guilt.] If you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself." 28
it did not direct the jury to adopt any particular interpretation of the facts. Finally, the
instruction specifically provided that Montenegro's words alone were not sufficient to
prove her guilt. In light of the above, we conclude the court did not err by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 362.
V. There Was no Cumulative Error
"Under the 'cumulative error' doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may
nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial." (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th
694, 772, fn. 32.) " '[A] series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in
some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.' "
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.)
However, as discussed ante, since we have found none of Montenegro's claims of
error prejudicial, a cumulative error argument cannot be sustained. No errors occurred,
which whether viewed individually or in combination, could possibly have affected the
jury's verdict in this case. (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 704.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
29
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
30
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction, finding sufficient evidence of motive, opportunity, and premeditation to support the jury's verdict and the denial of the motion for acquittal.
Issues
Did the trial court err in denying the motion for acquittal under Penal Code section 1118.1?
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on provocation manslaughter?
Did the trial court err in its instructions regarding corpus delicti and consciousness of guilt?
Was there cumulative error requiring reversal?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The circumstantial evidence is substantial. The behavior of the defendant after the killing of Mr. Wiggins certainly is sufficient to let the case go forward.”
“The number of stab wounds and their placement on Wiggins's body also support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.”
“We conclude the above evidence sufficed to show that Montenegro acted with the intent necessary to commit first degree murder.”