California Court of Appeal May 3, 2016 No. D068486Unpublished
Filed 5/3/16 P. v. Medrano CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068486
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF34691)
JOEY LUNA MEDRANO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Raymond A.
Cota, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Alana Butler and Meredith S.
White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Joey Luna Medrano pleaded no contest to one charge of making criminal threats in
violation of Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a)1 (count 1). A second charge,
disobeying a court order in violation of section 166, subdivision (a)(4) (count 2), was
dismissed. The trial court placed Medrano on three years' formal probation and imposed
fees and probation terms as recommended by the probation officer. On appeal, Medrano
The underlying concern is the constitutional due process requirement of adequate notice.
(People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630.) A probation condition "must be
sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for
the court to determine whether the condition has been violated." (Reinertson, at pp. 324-
325.) If a probation condition has a "plain commonsense meaning, which is well settled,"
the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. (People v. Rodriquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d
389, 398 (Rodriquez).) The doctrine requires no more than reasonable certainty of what
is being prohibited. (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117.)
Whether a probation condition is void for vagueness is a question of pure law. (In re
Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 815.)
B. Probation Conditions
Medrano challenges the probation conditions requiring him to "totally abstain
from the use of alcoholic beverages," and requiring him to "totally abstain from the use or
possession of alcoholic beverages even in his own home." Medrano contends that these
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two conditions should include a knowledge requirement so he is not faulted for violating
his probation should he accidentally consume or possess alcohol. We disagree. A
substantial body of case law establishes that a "probationer cannot be punished for
presence, possession, association, or other actions absent proof of scienter." (Patel,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) Generally, therefore, it is not necessary to include an
express scienter requirement in probation orders. Further, "[a] court may not revoke
probation unless the evidence supports 'a conclusion [that] the probationer's conduct
constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.' " (People v.
Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295, quoting People v. Galvan (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 978, 982.) Because a scienter requirement is inherent in these two probation
conditions, Medrano will not be punished for unwillingly violating the conditions.
Medrano's reliance on People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 594 is
misplaced. In Rodriguez, the court added a knowledge requirement to a condition that
prohibited the use and possession of alcohol, intoxicants, narcotics, or other controlled
substances because the category of intoxicants is "susceptible of different interpretations,
which may include common items . . . [and] the addition of an express knowledge
requirement will eliminate any potential for vagueness or overbreadth in applying the
condition." (Ibid.) General intoxicants, which are not included in the probation
condition here, have the potential to be interpreted differently. "Alcohol" is not vague,
and the condition thus clearly states what it sets out to prohibit. (See id. at p. 593
[" 'Although the possessor's knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and its
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nature as a restricted dangerous drug must be shown, no further showing of a subjective
mental state is required.' "].)
Medrano also challenges the condition that he "follow all standard terms of
probation and reasonable orders of the probation officer." Medrano asserts this condition
is unconstitutionally vague and should be stricken because it suggests he may be
expected to follow standard conditions that were not specifically listed in his probation
order. We disagree. The condition is reasonably interpreted to mean Medrano must
follow the conditions of his probation as they have been explained to him, as well as the
reasonable orders of his probation officer. Because this condition has a commonsense
meaning and can be reasonably interpreted, it is not unconstitutionally vague.
(Rodriquez, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 398.)
Lastly, Medrano challenges the condition stating that he "shall not enter the
premises of any business whose main product being sold is that of alcoholic beverages."
Medrano asserts that even if a knowledge requirement is added, the condition remains
unconstitutionally vague. Because it is unclear what is meant by " 'main product being
sold,' " he argues "it is not clear whether alcohol must be the 'main product' relative to the
number of items offered for sale, the number of items that are actually sold, or the
amount of revenue generated." The Attorney General responds that a knowledge
requirement should be added to this condition so that Medrano cannot be found in
violation if he unknowingly enters an establishment whose main product being sold is
alcoholic beverages. The Attorney General argues that such a requirement sufficiently
clarifies this condition.
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We agree with the Attorney General. As discussed, probation conditions are
subject to the "void for vagueness doctrine," which requires only reasonable certainty of
what is being prohibited. If it is reasonable for Medrano not to know that a business's
main product being sold is alcoholic beverages, he will not be punished for entering the
premises of any such business. A knowledge requirement therefore is sufficient to clarify
the condition so that it is clear Medrano can only be found in violation if he is aware the
business's main product is alcohol. (Reinertson, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 324-325;
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117.) We will modify the
probation condition accordingly.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the drug testing fee. Probation condition No.
10 in the sentencing order dated June 17, 2015, is modified to state: "Defendant shall not
enter the premises of any business where he knows or reasonably should know the main
product being sold is that of alcoholic beverages." The judgment is affirmed as modified.
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The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly and to forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
PRAGER, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 14
AI Brief
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Holding. The court affirmed the judgment but modified it to strike an unauthorized drug testing fee and to add a knowledge requirement to a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from entering liquor stores.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in imposing discretionary fees without sufficient evidence of the defendant's ability to pay.
Whether the trial court erred in imposing a drug testing fee when the defendant was not convicted of a drug-related offense.
Whether certain probation conditions were unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We affirm the judgment, but modify to strike the drug testing fee, and modify the probation condition precluding Medrano from entering any liquor store to include a knowledge requirement.”
“Because Medrano was not convicted of a drug-related crime, the fee was imposed erroneously and should be stricken.”
“Defendant shall not enter the premises of any business where he knows or reasonably should know the main product being sold is that of alcoholic beverages.”